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Abstract 
The recent Global Financial Crisis was the ultimate manifestation for the 
recognition and appreciation of people risk, one of the dimensions constituting 
operational risk, highlighting the necessity of people risk management within the 
ILQDQFLDO LQGXVWU\ ,Q UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH PDJQLWXGH RI LWV LPSDFW µSHRSOH ULVN¶
EHFDPH D ¶KRW¶ WRSLF DPRQJVW WKH ILQDQFLDO UHJXODWRUV ZKLFK UHVXOWHG LQ WKH
stipulation of assigning capital reserves, exclusively dedicated to its coverage. 
However, the nature of people risk is attached with the impediment of broadness 
and diversity, which leaves operational risk managers victims of uncertainty of its 
unidentified boundaries. With the purpose of analysing people risk, and capturing 
its scope, McConnell (2008) has developed a theoretical framework consisting of 
IRXU µHVFDODWLQJ¶ GLPHQVLRQV QDPHO\ LQFLGHQW LQGLYLGXDO LQVWLWXWLRQ DQG
industry. The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which this theoretical 
framework is applicable in practice, by conducting a qualitative content analysis 
using the Financial Services Advisory Final Notices imposed on banks and 
insurance firms as evidence. The investigation attempts to find whether there is 
a correlaWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWKHRUHWLFDOIUDPHZRUNDQGWKHµUHDO¶HYLGHQFHLQRUGHU
to evaluate its validity. The analysis finds that, in fact, there is evidence assuring 
its validity, yet there is room for improvements for more accurate outcomes. The 
study recommends that the framework should expand the dimensions 
constituting the framework. Possible suggestions are to include additional 
GLPHQVLRQV LQ UHODWLRQ WR V\VWHP DQG SURFHVV ULVN DQG WKH µ7KUHH OLQHV RI
GHIHQFH¶PRGHO 
 
Keywords: People Risk, People Risk Framework, Operational Risk, Operational 
Risk Management, Organisational Culture 
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1. Introduction  
Operational risk (OpRisk) is the contemporary risk category which characterises 
the risk of losses arising from anything but credit and market risk, such as, 
fraud, system and process failures, natural disasters, employee errors, 
information losses, lawsuits and computer hacking (Moosa, 2007). OpRisk has 
been introduced in the financial sector as a result of the collapse of Barings Bank 
in 1995; even Nick Leeson, the rogue trader responsible for this collapse, has 
EHHQFKDUDFWHULVHGDVWKHµWUXHDXWKRU¶DQGµXQZLWWLQJLQYHQWRU¶RI2S5LVN(Power, 
 7KLV RSHUDWLRQDO ORVV HYHQW SURYHG WR EH D µGHILQLQJ PRPHQW¶ IRU WKH
financial regulation, since it introduced OpRisk as a distinct form of financial risk, 
and for the first time it was required that banks should measure, manage, and 
allocate capital to it (Bryce, et. al, Forthcoming). However, despite the increasing 
awareness raised within the financial sector about the severe consequences of 
this type of risk, over the last decade, OpRisk management failures kept 
remaining the cause of major business failures and financial scandals. Inevitably, 
these losses which cost billions of dollars, have led to the spur of an ongoing 
interest paid to OpRisk by media, financial regulators, supervisors, executives, 
and the public. Such operational loss events include; Daiwa in 1995 and AIB in 
DVDUHVXOWRIXQGHWHFWHGLOOHJDOWUDGLQJ%HUQDUG0DGRII¶V3RQ]LVFKHPHLQ
2008; Socitété Generale in 2008 and UBS in 2011 due to rogue trading; and PPI 
scandals (1990s, 2011). Even though these events have provoked regulatory 
developments to quantify, manage, disclose and capture OpRisk, operational 
losses keep surfacing across the financial industry even until today, with the GFC 
being the most recent, designating new deficits in OpRisk management practices 
in place (Sturm, 2013).  
In effect, the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) µVKRRNWKHUHJXODWRU\V\VWHP¶
This is because, despite the previous attempts of Basel II (the accord of banking 
regulation) to provide more advanced risk measures, aiming to capture OpRisk; 
WKH*)&KDV LQGLFDWHG WKDW2S5LVNZDV RQH RI LWV µURRW FDXVHV¶ FODULI\LQJ WKDW
OpRisks were underestimated.  Evidently, the regulatory framework was not 
strong enough to prevent systemic risk. As Bryce et al. (Forthcoming) reports, 
Basel II relied too much on people across the whole corporate hierarchy, which 
required successful training and bRDUG HQJDJLQJ ZKLOH LQGLYLGXDOV¶ SHUFHSWLRQ
2 
 
influenced risk culture even further. Inevitably, these failures resulted into to its 
replacement by Basel III, its revised version, which will take effect during the 
current year. Simultaneously, as a result of the GFC, Solvency II accord, the 
respective capital adequacy regime for the European insurance industry which is 
greatly based on Basel II, is currently being finalised, and will come into effect in 
the beginning of 2016 (Lloyds, 2013). These regulatory changes aim to improve 
the existing risk management models and procedures within their sector 
distinctively, and within the financial industry as a whole. 
Under these accords, financial institutions are required to maintain a minimum 
capital requirement to guard against unexpected losses, while this buffer 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\UHGXFHVV\VWHPLFULVNWRDQµDFFHSWDEOHOHYHO¶LHWKHULVNWKDWD
single failure could generate additional failures along the financial system due to 
the interconnectedness of transactions and institutions across the industry) 
(Power, 2003). As a result of the globalised market, the purpose of the financial 
regulation is to promote international monetary and financial stability. In order to 
achieve these objectives, regulators try to strengthen the risk controls in the 
financial sector and to regulate the adequacy of the capital base by ensuring that 
enough capital is reserved to cover operational risks, in addition to credit and 
market risks, while reducing systemic risk. 
7KH %DVHO &RPPLWWHH RQ %DQNLQJ 6XSHUYLVLRQ WKH ZRUOG¶V VHQLRU EDQNLQJ
UHJXODWRU\ERDUGKDVGHILQHG2S5LVNE\LGHQWLI\LQJLWVµURRWFDXVHV¶0F&RQQHOO	
Blacker, 2011), specifically; µWKHULVNRIORVVHVUHVXOWLQJIURPLQDGHTXDWHRUIDLOHG
LQWHUQDOSURFHVVHVSHRSOHDQGV\VWHPVRU IURPH[WHUQDOHYHQWV¶ (BCBS, 2006: 
p.114). This definition includes operational losses resulting from events such as 
damage to physical assets, legal risks, loss of data, and other factors that result 
in unexpected losses, except reputational and strategic risks. It also identifies 
several event types that are specific to people risk such as loss of key 
employees, internal and external fraud, and improper business practices 
(McConnell & Blacker, 2011). The definition implies that in order to measure 
OpRisk, institutions should be able to accurately assess all the dimensions of 
2S5LVN7KLVSDSHUIRFXVHVRQO\RQµSHRSOHULVN¶GLPHQVLRQ6HYHUDODXWKRUs have 
WULHG WR GHILQH µSHRSOH ULVN¶ KRZHYHU DV 0F&RQQHOO  DUJXHV WKH
boundaries of this particular risk are not well defined, despite the regulatory 
attempts to cover people-related risks in the capital requirements. Nevertheless, 
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this is not surprising considering the difficulties in measuring and predicting 
human behaviour. Hence, without a proper understanding of this particular 
dimension of OpRisk (i.e. people risk), firms are unable to manage and 
µDFFXUDWHO\¶ DVVHVV WKH QHFHVVDU\ FDSLWDO UHTXirements to safeguard from 
systemic risk.  
Indeed, investigation of the GFC conducted by several authors (Dedu, et al., 
2011; Kirkpatrick, 2009; McConnell & Blacker, 2011; Ashby, 2010) demonstrated 
that systemic people-related failures (incurred from indivLGXDOV¶ DFWLRQV DQG
behaviours), in relation to both risk management and corporate governance 
across the whole of financial industry, were principle instigators of the outburst 
of the GFC1. People-UHODWHGULVNVLQFOXGHµSUREOHPVWKDWDUHUHODWHGWRDFWLRQV, or 
non-DFWLRQVE\LQGLYLGXDOV¶ (McConnell & Blacker, 2011: p.85). One of the most 
predominant aspects of the crisis was the human and cultural weaknesses which 
resulted from ill-defined values and beliefs (Ashby, 2010). However, it was 
indicated that these weaknesses were incubating in the organizations long before 
WKH*)&7KH OLTXLGLW\ LVVXHVWKDWDURVHLQDFWHGDVWKHµWULJJHUHYHQW¶IRU
the outburst of the immense financial losses. These weaknesses have portrayed 
the flaws of the financial institutions, and most importantly their regulators, in 
providing the appropriate internal measures in managing and controlling human 
behaviour in their business and the financial industry in general.  Thus, one of 
the outcomes of the financial crisis is the need of improved people-risk 
management. As McConnell and Blacker (2011) suggests, the role of people risk 
management should be formally recognised by regulators, as an independent 
skilled function within the risk management function, with well-defined 
responsibilities and protections (McConnell & Blacker, 2011: p.113). Of course, 
DV*UHHQWKHIRUPHUFKDLUPDQRI+6%&DUJXHVµEHWWHUULVNPDQDJHPHQW
enhanced regulatLRQ FRGLILFDWLRQ RI GLUHFWRUV¶  responsibilities in company law, 
                                                             
1
 More precisely, it is not argued that the primary cause of the GFC was due to OpRisks or people-related 
issues, but rather unsustainable credit risk was the cause/evolution of the crisis that originated from the US 
subprime crisis that led to the collapse of major financial institutions creating solvency crisis. This
 
caused capital 
markets to freeze, leading to liquidity crisis where banks and insurers were unable to fund their financial 
operations. These events gradually resulted in the faltering of the global economy due to the high 
ŝŶƚĞƌĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚŶĞƐƐĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƚŚĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨDĐŽŶŶĞůůĂŶĚůĂĐŬĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?
none of these events were caused by a single individual or a group of individuals, rather they were eventually 
developed and  accelerated as a consequence of actions or non-actions of many trusted bankers.
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and many other necessary operations, will only be sufficient with a defined 
culture of values. 
8QGRXEWHGO\ KLVWRU\ KDV UHYHDOHG WKDW WKH RQO\ µFRPPRQ GHQRPLQDWRU¶ RI
operational loss events is human behaviour and more generally, people-related 
failures. McConnell (2008) states that people risks are the risks that give rise to 
WKHLQGXVWU\¶VJUHDWHVWRSHUDWLRQDOORVVHV&RQVHTXHQWO\WKLVHYLGHQFHUDLVHVWKH
TXHVWLRQ ZKHWKHU µ2S5LVN PDQDJHPHQW LV DOO DERXW PDQDJLQJ SHRSOH¶ DQG DV
Martin (2009) states, if this argument is true, organisational culture is the central 
theme in the entire debate concerning OpRisk management. Culture can be 
explained DV µKRZ HPSOR\HHV EHKDYH ZKHQ QR RQH LV ORRNLQJ¶ 1HYHUWKHOHVV
despite the fact that since the mid 1990s OpRisk events have indicated that 
µSHRSOH¶ DUH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU QHDUO\ HYHU\ RSHUDWLRQDO ORVV HYHQW UHVXOWLQJ IURP
inefficient internal controls, regulators still provide little guidance in dealing with 
people risk, which as McConnell (2008) described it, it is the greatest risk 
financial institutions are exposed to. This negligence towards people-related risks 
can also be emphasised by the fact that it appears only once within the main 
Basel II document, and only in the definition of OpRisk itself (McConnell, 
2008).  In addition, the document clearly refers to more than just the internal 
SHRSOH RU µHPSOR\HHV¶ RI DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ LW DOVR UHFRJQLVHV H[WHUQDO IUDXG
however, regulators have provided little guidance as to the full scope of the term 
(McConnell, 2008). 
Moreover, given that there is an extensive body of literature on the root cause 
analysis of managerial and operational losses in other sectors, there is only a 
OLPLWHG DFDGHPLF UHVHDUFK RQ WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI µSHRSOH ULVN¶ RU SHRSOH
management in the financial sector. This may be explained by two reasons; 
firstly, losses are not related to deadly events, and secondly, many people 
consider that, when they refer to organisational culture, in fact, they refer to 
employees. Nevertheless, financial losses and the collapse of any bank have 
tremendous catastrophic consequences for an economy. Additionally, there is 
HYLGHQFHWKDWµSHRSOH¶DQGSDUWLFXODUO\µPDQDJHUV¶DQGµHPSOR\HHV¶DUHWKHRQHV
responsible for large institutional losses, while failure to capture people-related 
risks was proved to be the fundamental weakness of the financial system during 
the GFC. However, it is remarkable that there is only a limited body of research 
specialising merely on people risk, including identification and mitigation 
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techniques. Understanding its importance and identifying possible areas that 
these risks can potentially arise may be an important step towards managing 
people risks. However, in order to do so, a good starting point of this niche area 
in the literature would be to examine the extent to which the existing theories 
are compatible with reality, which will enable further development within the 
empirical literature.  
This current paper aims to tackle this gap in the literature, by considering the 
extent to which the People Risk Framework, suggested by McConnell (2008) can 
be used by practitioners to analyse people risk, and the extent to which it 
captures its scope.  Therefore, the validity of the framework will be tested 
through an investigation of the Financial Services Advisory Final Notices (FSAFN) 
imposed to banks and insurers, operating within the UK financial market during 
the last five years (2008-2012). The investigation will focus on the identification 
of people behaviour and actions, and the reasoning of this behaviour. The 
analysis will seek to find whether a correlation exists between the real-life 
evidence and the four escalating theoretical dimensions of people risk 
framework, namely; incident, individual, institution, and industry. From this 
analysis, it is expected that an insight will be gained regarding the scope of 
people risk which will facilitate the evaluation of the framework, and it will enable 
the researcher to spot possible improvements in relation to the framework and 
perhaps, in relation to the Financial Services Authority (FSA). Lastly, it is 
important to mention that although this paper acknowledges that FSA has been 
currently replaced by Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), it will be referring to the 
regulation as FSA since the period in which is referring to is prior to the new 
regulation.   
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows; Section 2 discusses the 
background of people risk by drawing attention to the role of financial services in 
the market, financial regulation, OpRisk and finally, people risk. Section 3 
explains the methodology employed in this research paper. Section 4 discusses 
the results of the analysis, and finally, Section 5 discusses concluding remarks, 
limitations and recommendations.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
The following sHFWLRQ ZLOO GLVFXVV WKH EDFNJURXQG RI µSHRSOH ULVN¶ LQ ILQDQFLDO
institutions by stressing the importance of the financial services in the market, 
how the financial institutions operate and how they are regulated domestically 
and internationally. Then, OpRisk will be discussed, followed by an evaluation of 
WKHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUHRIµSHRSOHULVN¶ 
2.2. The role of Financial Services in the Market 
Financial services play a substantial role in the social wellbeing and the economy 
in terms of growth and development, both domestically and, as a result of 
globalisation, internationally. Despite the increasing complexity of (relatively) 
new products in the financial market, traditionally, the two fundamental 
contributions of the financial sector are its ability to allocate resources and to 
manage risks (Bryce, et al., Forthcoming). The financial products they offer (i.e. 
banking, savings, investment, insurance, debt and equity funding, etc.) have the 
DELOLW\ WR SURYLGH SURILWDEOH µHFRQRPLF RSSRUWXQLWLHV¶ LQFOXGLQJ DOOocation and 
PRQLWRULQJ RI VRFLHW\¶V VDYLQJV IDFLOLWDWLRQ RI ULVN DPHOLRUDWLRQ DQG WUDGLQJ
Essentially, they help businesses and individuals to raise funds, reduce financial 
uncertainties by offering risk mitigation services, save money, and build credit; 
while enabling the start-up or expansion of a business by plummeting 
vulnerability and managing their assets profitably (Sutton & Jenkins, 2007). 
Fundamentally, they control the well-functioning of the financial system, under 
which market efficiency is encouraged through improvements in capital 
allocation, economic growth, reduction of income inequality, and increased 
competition, domestically and internationally. Therefore, with their substantial 
expertise, reputation and geographical reach, these institutions are usually large 
enough to have a tremendous impact on the way the entire market operates by 
XVLQJ GHOLEHUDWH VWUDWHJLHV WR H[SDQG WKHVH µHFRQRPLF RSSRUWXQLWLHV¶ WKURXJK
their business models. Further, due to their large size, financial institutions can 
enjoy economies of scale which allows them to have a comparative advantage in 
resource allocation and risk management, as they are able to predict the 
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variance on both sides of their balance sheet more accurately (Bryce, et al., 
Forthcoming). 
In particular reference to the UK economy, the importance of the role of the 
financial sector can be stressed by the fact that it contributes to more than 8% of 
WKHFRXQWU\¶V*'37KH&LW\8.$FFRUGLQJWR%%$DQG$%,
banks and insurance firms dominate the UK financial services industry (Bryce, et 
al., Forthcoming). In addition to this, the deputy Prime Minister of the country 
VWDWHG WKDW WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V VKRUW-WHUP SODQ LV WR UHEDODQFH WKH FRXQWU\¶V
economy away from the overreliance on the financial sector (Gov.UK, 2011). 
These facts indicate how important the financial sector is for the sustainability of 
the UK economy. Over the last few decades, the UK financial service sector has 
been forced to continuously adapt to changes both in the wider economy and 
within the sector itself. These changes have led the financial institutions to 
strategically move away from their traditional business lines by undertaking 
more complex project or activities; a case particularly apparent during the recent 
GFC. This transforming environment can be traced back to the mid-80s where 
the UK financial system started to be extensively formalised and regulated 
(Moran, 1989). As a result, organisational controls and OpRisk management 
FDPHIRUZDUGDVDQµH[SOLFLWUHJXODWRU\UHVRXUFH¶WKXVQHZUROHVLHFRPSOLDQFH
officer, OpRisk manager) were created to deal with the new demanding 
regulatory rules (Power, 2012).  
Additionally, in 1997 the FSA was established, as the domestic supervisory 
regulatory body, with the aim of reducing financial crime including money-
laundering, internal fraud, misuse of client assets and, maintaining market 
FRQILGHQFH (YHU VLQFH LWV IRUPDWLRQ LWV µRYHUDUFKLQJ SULQFLSOH¶ UHJDUGLQJ
management and control is that a firm must take reasonable care to organise 
and control its activities responsibly, with adequate risk management systems 
(Power, 2012). Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) described this regulatory strategy 
DVµHQIRUFHGVHOI-UHJXODWLRQ¶VLQFHLQRUGHUIRUWKHUHJXODWHGILUPWRFRPSO\ZLWK
this principle, they are given the authority to arrange their activities in a way 
that best suits their business model. Even though this regulatory strategy 
introduced internal control systems as a key source for this kind of regulatory 
style (Power, 2012), the model of substantial self-regulation, with regulators 
proclaiming only general rules rather than detailed ones, has been substantially 
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discredited as a result of the financial crisis (Schooner & Taylor, 2010).  In 
response to these failures, the elder model of financial regulation has been 
reformed, and the FSA is currently being replaced by the FCA which is mostly 
focused on consumer protection, promoting competition in the interest of 
consumers and protecting and enhancing integrity of the UK financial system 
(Allen & Overy, 2013).  
Bryce, et al., (2011) argue that FSA has shaped the way in which the UK 
financial institutions conduct their daily operations. In support of their argument, 
this can be justified considering the riskiness involved in their activities, and the 
substantial role they play in the well-IXQFWLRQLQJ RI WKH FRXQWU\¶V HFRQRP\
+RZHYHU FRQVLGHULQJ WKH JOREDOLVHG QDWXUH RI WRGD\¶V ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP LW LV
essential that the domestic regulation is structured in accordance with the 
international regulation (i.e. the Basel III and Solvency II accords). These 
accords aim to develop a greater insight to the trends and practices of the 
current financial industry, in order to supplement more powerful risk 
management solutions (Bryce, et al., 2011). The latest versions of these 
frameworks highlight the importance of OpRisk management within the sector, 
while directing regulatory attention on the organisational control systems and 
cultures of control, reflecting OpRisk as a key component of global banking and 
insurance regulation (Power, 2005; Hoyte, 2005). 
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2.2.1. What Financial Institutions do 
)XQGDPHQWDOO\WKHILQDQFLDOV\VWHPFRQWUROVDQGPDQDJHVµFUHGLW¶ZKLOHLWUHOLHV
on individuals (or investors) to provide the funds required to acquire the 
resources needed (Cetina & Preda, 2005). Credit seekers are given money 
(resources funded by the investors) in the form of debts, which are the claims 
investors can make on future income and on economic output and development. 
These claims usually take the form of corporate shares, or bonds, which are 
traded in the financial market through the help of financial institutions (i.e. 
banks, insurers) that act as agents or financial intermediaries. Their role is to 
µSDFNDJHWKHGHDOVDVVXPHVRPHof the risks, and facilitate the trading of claims 
DQG ULVNV DPRQJVW PDUNHW SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ &HWLQD 	 3UHGD  S 7KH
H[LVWHQFHRIWKHILQDQFLDOPDUNHWVLVRQHRIWKHPDMRUFRPSRQHQWVRIWKHµFUHGLW
mechanism in risk-EDVHGHFRQRPLHV¶DVWKH\DOORZWhe relocation and control of 
claims and risks amongst the participants and the relocation of wealth for capital 
use, while pursuing additional profits through sophisticated trading. 
Nevertheless, according to Cetina and Preda (2005), financial activities are a 
defining characteristic of the corporate economy, the welfare and social security 
system and, general culture. 
2QH RI WKH GHILQLQJ FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI WKH ILQDQFLDO VHFWRU LV WKDW LW LV µUXQ RQ
WUXVW¶ WKLV LV ZK\ PDUNHW FRQILGHQFH LV HVVHQWLDO 7KLV Ls inevitable since its 
products are built upon some form of financial commitment, RU DQ µH[FKDQJH
UHODWLRQVKLS¶, amongst the counterparties involved. The long-term nature of 
these financial products, their complexity, their importance to individual 
wellbeiQJ DQG WKH ODFN RI LQGLYLGXDOV¶ H[SHUWLVH LQ MXGJLQJ WKH SURGXFW
performance, imply that customers perceive high levels of risks when making 
purchase decisions (AIFA, 2012). Therefore, it is important for the parties 
involved to be assured that their counterparty will be remaining in business and 
that, their financial interests are protected. Faced with such uncertainties, 
customers usually seek the advice on product selection (type and quality) from 
financial institutions. However, in consequence of the growing failures in the 
sector, such as the recent GFC and PPI scandal, there is an increasing concern 
about the extent to which these institutions are trustworthy; inducing customers 
to lose their trust in them. In particular, the recent PPI scandal, with WKH8.¶V
largest banks being the largest distributors of these products, has had a 
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considerable negative impact on the financial services industry. It was estimated 
that the cost of the customer compensation to the UK banking sector amounted 
to £8 billion (Reuters, 2011).  As a result, the FSA (2011) VWDWHGµFRQILGHQFHLQ
WKHILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVVHFWRUDVDZKROHLVDWORZOHYHO¶)6$a: p.15). Given 
WKH VHFWRU¶V LPSRUWDQFH LQ WKH PDUNHW DV ZHOO DV WKH IUDJLOH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV LQ
which the sector is built upon, it is not surprising that the financial sector is 
highly regulated, since the costs of making mistakes are considerable. 
Government and regulators have been keen over the years to force financial 
LQVWLWXWLRQV WR EH µSUXGHQW¶ KRZHYHU GXULQJ WKH *)C, financial institutions 
RYHUORRNHG WKH µEDVLF UXOHVRIRSHUDWLQJ¶DQGH[SDQGHG WKHLUEDODQFH VKHHWVDW
WKHµH[SHQVHRILQFUHDVLQJULVN¶%U\FHHWDO)RUWKFRPLQJ 
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2.2.2. How they Operate 
2.2.2.1. Banks 
Historically, banks have been the main source of financing to a vast majority of 
economic participants, from individuals and multinational corporations to 
countries, which justifies why banks collectively and individually acquire a 
substantial stake in the on-going economic viability of these borrowers (Teeters, 
1983). In brief, banks act as intermediaries between people who want to save 
their money and earn some interest, and those that need money. Therefore, they 
earn income by selling money in the form of loans, overdrafts, certificates of 
deposits among other financial products, while they charge a transaction fee and 
an interest on loans which is lower than the interest they pay on deposit 
accounts. The interest rate is set according to the number of borrowers, the 
funds available to the bank and the LIBOR rate; the rate charged for inter-bank 
lending. It is also affected by the level of risk attached to the loan, in other 
words, the probability that the loan-holder will default. Additional income is 
earned by charging transaction fees when providing services to individuals and 
business including foreign exchange, credit/debit cards ATM access, investments 
and securities.  
2.2.2.2. Insurance 
Similarly, insurance companies provide risk management services. Their main 
function is to accept risks from their customers, pool them together, and manage 
them actively by redistributing them partly in the financial markets, and partly to 
reinsurers. Since claims normally will not occur all at once, the total cost of risk 
management is reduced for everyone in the pool. Insurance contracts involve a 
payment made to the insured upon the occurrence of an adverse, predetermined 
event (such as, car accident, natural catastrophe, health problems), in exchange 
IRUDVWHDG\VWUHDPRISUHPLXPVLQVXUHU¶VOLDELOLWLHVSDLGLQDGYDQFH7KHPDLQ
services they provide include security against financial losses (theft or accident), 
investment services, and risk management consultation. Security is provided by 
transferring the risks of the insured to the insurer, where a funding upon a claim 
can be granted; a service particularly important for risk-averse individuals. By 
pooling the prepaid premiums and investing them profitably, policyholders can 
WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI WKH LQVXUHU¶V LQYHVWPHQW H[SHUWLVH WKH UHGXFHG XQLW FRVWV
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(derived through the exploitation of economies of scale), as well as the spreading 
of the investment risks.  Lastly, insurers are able to offer risk management 
advice. For example, when an insurance contract is signed for a property, 
insurers advice their customer on how risks can be reduced, i.e. reduction of 
theft incidents by installing security systems; in this way premiums can also be 
discounted. Montross (2011) argues that, well-managed insurers firstly 
XQGHUVWDQGWKDWWKH\DUHLQWKHULVNDVVXPLQJEXVLQHVVDQGDVVXFKµQXUWXUH¶D
cXOWXUH WKDW KDV D KHDOWK\ UHVSHFW IRU ULVN &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH\ DUH µIDQDWLFDO¶
about receiving compensation on their balance sheet, and they keep track on 
their assets to ensure that they do not overexpose themselves to one type of risk 
creating an aggregating problem.  
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2.2.3. Comparison of Banks and Insurers 
In general, financial institutions provide strong and diversified instruments that 
are more manageable during periods of financial distress, whilst they provide 
greater stability to the financial system together with alternative funding 
opportunities for the borrowers. However, even though the two types of financial 
institutions serve two completely different aspects of the market, with insurers 
proving a more specific line of services, thus less exposed to risk, they are both 
exposed to risk in their daily operations (Al-Darwish, et al., 2011).  Nonetheless, 
the two sectors are fundamentally different. More explicitly, insurance risk is 
µLGLRV\QFUDWLF¶DQGLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHHFRQRPLFF\FOHGXHWRWKHIDFWWKat claim 
payments occur years after they have been collected, making insurers to have 
stable portfolios to manage, with long-term horizon (The Geneva Association, 
2010). On the other hand, banks deal with all types of contracts including short-
term, long-term, liquid demand deposits, etc., therefore banks are exposed to 
credit and liquidity risks associated to lending activities and the mismatch from 
µERUURZLQJ VKRUW DQG OHQGLQJ ORQJ¶ $V D UHVXOW EDQN-specific risks are largely 
influenced by the economic cycle (The Geneva Association, 2010).  These 
differences arise from the divergence in their business models, making the 
nature of capital required by both institutions naturally different. In essence, the 
banking business model is asset driven, leveraged with a vast range of activities. 
Conversely, the insurance business model is liquidity driven, funded by the 
prepaid premiums, enabling liabilities to provide more loss absorption than 
banks, and consequently, inducing insurance firms to be less exposed to liquidity 
risks (Al-Darwish, et al., 2011). Additionally, in banking, the valuation and 
accounting of assets and liabilities are more retrospective than in insurance 
under Solvency II, implying greater firmness in the reported values for banks 
than for insurers (Al-Darwish, et al., 2011). Also, unlike insurers that are able to 
change the risk profile of their balance sheet, banks use different tools, 
indicating an additional difference in the way they change the risk profile of their 
balance sheet.  
These divergences suggest the existence of the variances in the composition of 
the level and quality of capital amongst the two sectors (Al-Darwish, et al., 
2011), while they clarify the reasons why banks are more fragile during crises 
than the insurance companies. The GFC indicated that insurance firms have a 
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more stable capital base than that of banks. This can be explained by the fact 
that banks are largely dependent on the wholesale market and the interbank 
lending, which are both built upon trust amongst them, making the banking 
sector to be largely affected by the changing economic environment. 
Consequently, these differences between the two types of institutions may justify 
the existence of the two distinctive regulatory accords; Basel III and Solvency II.  
The European Commission suggests that the general rules of the two sectors 
should be compatible in order to establish consistent regulation across the 
financial industry, i.e. similar products in the two industries to be treated 
similarly, in order to avoid arbitrary opportunities in the market. However, as 
Gatzert and Wesker (2011) argue, due to the differences in economic and 
business activities, the two regulatory regimes will have to differ. Nevertheless, 
6ROYHQF\,,LVRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHµ%DVHO,,IRUWKHLQVXUDQFHLQGXVWU\¶%U\FH
et al. Forthcoming) as it is built upon the Basel II three-pillar structure. The 
three-pillar structure refers to the following; Pillar I which focuses on modelling 
and sets quantitative requirements concerning capital and risk measurements; 
Pillar II which involves qualitative conditions of risk management such as, the 
VXSHUYLVRU\DFWLYLWLHVRYHUWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VULVNPDQDJHPHQWDFWLYLWLHVDQG3LOODU
III which focuses on disclosure requirements by regulated firms. Therefore, the 
two regulatory accords are built upon common grounds, and overlapping 
objectives, that aim to improve the quality of capital, while suggesting different 
requirements to common issues. Particularly, as a result of the GFC, Basel III 
targets an incremental enhancement of the quality and quantity of banking 
FDSLWDOZKLOH6ROYHQF\,,FRQFHQWUDWHVRQWKHVWUHQJWKHQLQJRIWKHSROLF\KROGHUV¶
SURWHFWLRQ WKURXJK µWDLORULQJ¶ WKH TXDQWLW\ DQG TXDOLW\ RI UHJXODWRU\ FDSLWDO
required to reflect the risks of each insurer, rather than raising the regulatory 
requirements of the sector as a whole.   
Although the activities of the two sectors are partially overlapping, Al-Darwish, et 
al. (2011), recommends that the two accords should consider the collective 
allegation of the behavioural incentives that the two regimes provide, by 
targeting the reduction of the risk of unintended consequences associated with 
seemingly inconsistent treatment of the same risks under the respective accords. 
This may potentially avoid unintentional arbitrage between internal models and 
the standardised approach under Solvency II, as has happened under Basel II. 
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Moreover, Gatzert and Wesker (2011) who conducted a comparative assessment 
of the two accords concluded that, regulators should be cautious regarding 
regulatory bureaucracy and impediments that may encourage reduction of 
WUDQVSDUHQF\ VXJJHVWLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI µSURSRUWLRQDOLW\ SULQFLSOH¶ 6XFK D
principle implies that risk management, capital requirements, and reporting 
requirements should correspond to the risk condition of the specific institution 
rather that to the industry as a whole. Lastly, Ashby, et al., (2012) found 
evidence that bureaucracy impacts negatively the organisational culture as it 
imposes pressure on individuals affecting the employee morale adversely. 
Therefore, when setting rules and regulations, regulators should ensure that 
bureaucracy is kept to the minimum possible level to avoid such adverse 
effects.   
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2.3. The Rise of OpRisk 
OpRisk has been around ever since the introduction of banking, however, its 
transforming nature throughout the years, deregulation, globalisation, the 
evolution of technology, and the introduction of automation on a broad scale 
have led to the rise of its importance, while inevitably, caught regulatory 
attention (Moosa, 2007; Cummins, et al., 2006; Meyer, 2000; Buchelt & 
Unteregger, 2004). It has been proved that recent developments in the use of e-
commerce, mergers and acquisitions, complex technology, outsourcing 
arrangements, complicated financial assets and multinational trading procedures 
are responsible for the manifestation of operational losses (Cummins, et al., 
2006; Moosa, 2007). Buchelt and Unteregger (2004) argue that although the risk 
of fraud and external events always existed, these changes have enhanced the 
likelihood of OpRisk loss events, and unavoidably, transformed business risk 
management to a key senior executive concern. In essence, these advances are 
responsible for the changing risk profile of the financial institutions and their 
exposure to OpRisk. In particular, it has increased competition and the need for 
cost reduction, as well as improved risk-based decision making (Ashby, 2008), 
thus explaining the reason why the concept of OpRisk was transformed from 
µDQ\WKLQJ RWKHU WKDQPDUNHW DQG FUHGLW ULVN¶  to one of the three principal risk 
categories faced by the financial institutions (i.e. credit risk, market risk, and 
OpRisk). In fact, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed the 
incorporation of OpRisk to allocate the necessary resources to guard against 
systemic risk and introduced more advanced guiding principles for the OpRisk 
management.  
Despite the regulatory conversions, technological advances and financial 
innovation facilitate sophisticated risk measures and management practices while 
simultaneously, they accommodate even more sophisticated risk exposures. 
More explicitly, Buchelt and Unteregger (2004) argue that the changing nature 
and the degree of complexity generated by the sophisticated procedures create 
inexhaustible potential for errors and breakdowns of all types misguiding the 
employees to make more mistakes, the more complex their tasks are. As Dowd 
(2006) argues, greater sophistication generates; greater complexity (greater 
scope for error), less transparency (enabling errors harder to detect), and 
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greater dependence on assumptions (any of which may be faulty), hence causing 
over-reliance and underestimation of using such systems. 
Additionally, in many cases credit and market risks may be eliminated by these 
advances, however, new OpRisk exposures are created making it challenging to 
take the appropriate precautionary measures due to their unknown nature. This 
is the reason why there is an increasing concern in the literature on how to 
tackle OpRisk. Attempts to decrease market and credit risk have given rise to 
this contemporary type of risk. Such risks include system incompatibility, system 
failure, integration problems, risk of fraud etc. Nevertheless, exploiting and 
keeping up-to-date with technological advances are essential tools for the 
survival of financial institutions in the market. According to Meyer (2000), 
financial models and tools, and the environment in which they operate need to 
be managed and controlled, otherwise sophisticated risk management techniques 
are useless if their operating environment and management incentives are 
inefficient, or if fundamental risk management policies are ignored.  Therefore, to 
remain competitive, it is necessary that institutions keep pace with market 
innovations, and constantly adapt and improve their processes, whilst paying 
attention to the possible areas that OpRisks may raise.  
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2.3.1. Business Operations Model and OpRisk 
This sub-section attempts to analyse the business operations model of financial 
institutions in order to identify possible areas that OpRisk may occur, in order to 
be able to appreciate how financial regulation deals with OpRisk. To begin with, 
the model of the process is divided in two operational levels, the primary 
business environment, and the consecutive, support and control functions level 
as indicated in Figure 1. The primary business level consists of two distinctive 
areas; revenue generation, where the trading takes place through the front 
office, and processing activities, where front office support is provided before and 
after the transaction settlement. Then, support and control function follows, 
which comprises of 7 different compliance functions (Figure 1) that aim at 
monitoring and controlling the primary business level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1 Business Operation Model 
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Figure 2 and 3 (below) analyse each of the two operational levels respectively, 
including information about tasks, types of possible OpRisks, and effective 
control procedures at the primary level (see Figure 2) for each department, 
distinctively.  As the diagrams indicate, the possibility of loss arising from 
OpRisks exists in every operational level, while a failure occurring at any 
department affect the whole process since everything is interrelated, resulting 
intRDµFKDLQRIFDXVDWLRQ¶+RZHYHULQRUGHUWRUHGXFHWKHULVNVRIVXFKIDLOXUHV
it is essential to ensure that the front office operations are successfully 
operating, as they conduct customers directly and they are the first line of the 
business operations. In fact, history has indicated that some of the most serious 
operational losses have occurred at this level, such as fraud, commonly pursued 
by rogue traders (see Barings Bank, Société Générale, UBS). Therefore, the role 
of the front office support functions plays a substantial role in the process at the 
operational level, which further stresses the importance of the advanced level of 
the hierarchy (i.e. the support and control functions, see Figure 3), which is 
responsible to ensure that every operational line is operating according to the 
strategic plan. Consequently, any failure occurring at any part of the process 
affects the whole business model. 
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Primary Business Environment 
Processing Activities 
Front Office Support Functions 
Settlement & 
Post-Settlement 
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transactions through 
to settlement, 
ensuring key events 
are dealt, position 
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for the accounting 
function 
OpRisks: Failures 
cause delays in 
settlement 
Pre-Settlement Phase 
Task: Ensure the trade information 
passes smoothly into the front office 
support settlement systems 
OpRisks: Errors and delays leading 
to incorrect hedging, funding or 
settlement 
Controls: Legal agreement covering 
confirmation, confirmation checking 
function, frollow-uo actions to 
counterparties 
Revenue Generation 
Front Office 
Posisions: Traders, fund 
managers, sales staff, 
market risk managers 
Tasks: Customer 
Screening - Know your 
Customer, Standard 
Settlement instructions, 
Legal Contract 
Instructions 
OpRisks: Fraud, 
exceeding credit limit, 
trader errors 
Controls: Effective 
segregation pf duties, 
clear escalation 
procedures 
 
 
  
Figure 2 Process at the Primary Business Level 
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The Support and Control Functions 
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are 
negotiated 
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Task:  
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accurately 
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IT 
Task:  IT 
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maintainance 
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systems 
failures  
HR  
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monitoring, 
employee 
benefits, and 
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OpRisks: 
Failures in 
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Marketing 
Tasks: 
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mers and 
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business 
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Figure 3 Support and Control Functions 
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2.4. OpRisk and Regulation 
With the evolution of technology and globalisation, and the increased regulatory 
attention to OpRisk, it was inevitable that regulation will take the appropriate 
actions to include OpRisk in its regulatory framework. Therefore, to guide 
organisations in measuring the OpRisk capital requirements, Basel II introduced 
three approaches, namely; basic indicator, standardised, and advanced 
measurement, with the latter requiring the highest level of capital reserves. Each 
of them requires different levels of capital and different sophisticated levels of 
risk management to calculate the risk-based capital with respect to OpRisk, using 
domestic OpRisk metrics such as, internal and external loss data, scenario 
analysis, and risk mitigation techniques (i.e. KRIs 2). The accuracy of such a 
technique in predicting the future losses is based on the volume and quality of 
acquired information, inducing institutions to adopt the Loss Distribution 
Approach, ZKHUH WKH µFDSLWDO UHTXLUHPHQWV DUH VHW DFFRUGLQJ WR D KLVWRULFDO
database of operational loss events involving frequency and severity of losseV¶
(Bryce, et al., 2011: p.1163). Hence, this approach requires reporting of any 
internal or external operational loss event developed within a learning 
HQYLURQPHQWDORQJZLWKµQREODPH¶ culture. More explicitly, learning environment 
refers to organisations being able to integrate lessons learned from past events 
LQ WKHLURUJDQLVDWLRQDOFXOWXUHWRDYRLGVLPLODU ORVV LQFLGHQWV µ1REODPH¶ culture 
UHIHUVWRWKHHQFRXUDJHPHQWRIUHSRUWLQJDFFLGHQWVµQHDUPLVVHV¶DQGDQ\RWKHU
failure by employees, without being afraid of losing their job if the incident is 
somehow related to them.  
There is a debate across the empirical literature concerning the choice of the 
most suitable model and statistical approach to capture OpRisk, whilst setting 
the capital based requirement attached to each of these approaches has become 
a controversial issue amongst researchers. These debates arise due to the fact 
that domestic regulators allow flexibility in the choice of internal measures 
(Bryce, et al. Forthcoming). The following extract enclosed in the Goldman Sachs 
International Final Notice (2010) emphasises this statement, by arguing that 
although firms are allowed to organise their business in a way that its compliance 
function is responsible for regulatory notifications, senior managers are obligated 
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to notify the FSA about any related matter. It also stresses the importance of 
having adequate systems and controls with senior managers responsible for their 
effectives while ensuring the escalation of information across the business levels; 
¶V\VWHPVDQGFRQWUROVLQSODFHDUHUHTXLUHGWRHQVXUHWKDWUHOHYDQWLQIRUPDWLRQ
is shared appropriately and timely within their global legal and compliance 
functions...to ensure that the potential impact of overseas regulatory 
investigations is duly considered and local regulatory obligations are duly 
complied with...to ensure that the business...can be properly organised and 
controlled. While it is appropriate to organise a firm in such a way that its 
compliance function is responsible for making regulatory notifications, the FSA 
expects...senior managers, who become aware of a matter...to focus on the need 
for the firm to comply with its regulatory reporting obligations and to ensure that 
those responsible for...reporting obligations are properly informed of the 
information they need to know. Senior management must take responsibility for 
ensuring that the firm has effective systems in place to enable it to communicate 
promptly and appropriately all information of which the FSA would reasonably 
expect notice. Communication failures arising as a consequence of group 
structures or procedural deficiencies will neither excuse nor mitigate failures by 
firms to comply with that responsibility.µ)6$S 
The FSA has also provided a Handbook guidance, and other supporting materials, 
to supplement the principles and rules with the purpose to guide firms in 
choosing models and procedures  that best suit their business models, and to 
illustrate ways in which institutions can comply with the relevant rules (FSA, 
2011b). Yet, irrespective of the OpRisk management strategy adopted, 
institutions need to achieve a range of proportionate general risk management 
VWDQGDUGV GHSHQGLQJ RQ WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ¶V VL]H QDWXUH VFDOH DQG FRPSOH[LW\
Further, the BIPRU3 entails financial institutions to acquire a well-documented 
assessment and management system, with transparent reporting lines and 
responsibility subject to a regular independent audit (FSA, 2011b).  However, 
despite the regulatory attempts to mitigate operational losses, the banking 
regulation has been greatly criticised as it was proved that its effectiveness is 
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subject to failure due to its over-UHOLDQFHRQSHRSOH¶VGHFLVLRQVDQGDFWLRQVZKLFK
DUHRIWHQVXEMHFWWRLQGLYLGXDOV¶RZQMXGgement.    
Many authors argue that regulators failed to give much emphasis on all of the 
three regulatory Pillars, thus failed to effectively capture the key areas that give 
rise to risk exposures. Recently, it was revealed that banking and insurance 
sectors have become greatly dependent on quantitative models during the last 
thirty years (Dedu, et al., 2011; Tuckett, 2009; Montross, 2011; Dowd, 2006). It 
has been argued that a possible explanation to most of risk management issues 
is that inadequate attention was given to the qualitative part of risk 
management, which requires both subjective judgement and past experience. 
Particularly, regulators have focused on Pillar I, the quantitative modelling, 
instead of Pillar II, which is the more qualitative approach to risk management. 
Tad Montross, the Chairman and CEO of GenRe, explains that this regulatory 
inefficiency is a result of the ill-defined grounds that the regulatory framework is 
built upon. For this reason, he also expects that there will be a debate on 
6ROYHQF\,,,WRDGGUHVVWKHµXQLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFHVRI6ROYHQF\,,¶LQVHYHUDO
years (Montross, 2011). Since Solvency II is built based on Basell II/III grounds, 
this statement also refers to Basel III too. His argument is that Solvency II may 
µREVFXUH¶RUPLQLPL]HFHUWDLQW\SHVRIULVNVDQGOHDYHWKHLQGXVWU\H[SRVHGWRD
FULVLV µVLPLODU WR ZKDW WKH EDQNV MXVW H[SHULHQFHG¶ 7KH LVVXH LV WKDW DOWKRXJK
%DVHO,,,LPSRVHVVWULFWHUDQGPRUHµRQHURXV¶FDSLWDOFKDQJHVDQGUHTXLUHPHQWV
it is unclear whether risk will be better understood and managed (Montross, 
2011). Consequently, further negative effects may occur, since banks will be 
keen on moving into riskier assets as they will be earning lower ROE4 due to the 
higher capital reserves (Montross, 2011).  
Additionally, Martin (2009) argues that it was evident that the regulatory 
UHTXLUHPHQWVIDLOHGLQWKDWWKH\SODFHGFDSLWDODVDµIURQWOLQHRIGHIHQFH¶DJDLQVW
2S5LVNUDWKHU WKDQWKH µODVW OLQHRIGHIHQFH¶0DUWLQ$VKE\, and 
Blunden and Thirlwell (2010) support that proactive management and prevention 
of OpRisk is much more valuable than measuring the losses after they occur, 
justifying the failure of the regulatory committee in tackling OpRisk. Therefore, 
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regulation should encourage institutions to focus on developing a deeper 
understanding of risks, rather than building complex models (Montross, 2011). 
Furthermore, the risk management tools, such as VaR5, that these approaches 
use to calculate risk and manage capital reserves, are greatly criticised by many 
researchers since they fail to consider the behavioural risks. Particularly, Dedu, 
et al., (2011) argue that uncertainty and risks cannot be managed without 
DFFRXQWLQJIRUWKHµHPRWLRQDOSDUW¶RIWKHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVVLPDJLQDWLRQ
desire, behavioural biases like herding, confirmation etc. As Tuckett (2009) 
states, financial markets will always tend to be subject to greed, over-
excitement, anxiety, panic and divided states of mind; therefore, the 
sophisticated economic and financial modelling will always be subject to bias and 
ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRµFUHDWHWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDWULVNLVEHLQJPDQDJHG¶ 
Moreover, Bryce et al. (Forthcoming) reports that the effectiveness of Basel II 
was subject to the reliance upon people for effective decision making; the 
importance of good training for empowering of staff; the importance of board 
OHYHO HQJDJHPHQW DQG WKH LQGLYLGXDOV¶ RZQ YLHZV DQG SHUFHSWLRQV WKDW
influenced the implementation of organisational structure. Thus, taking into 
consideration the delicacy of the effectiveness of the regulation including, the 
ODFN RI SURYLGLQJ µHPSOR\HH PDQDJHPHQW¶ JXLGDQFH E\ WKH UHJXODWRUV LW LV QR
surprise that human-related failures dominated the real causes of the financial 
crisis.   
  
                                                             
5
 Value at Risk 
26 
 
2.5. OpRisk Management and People Risk Management 
Ever since the creation of the banking industry, risk-taking is an integral part of 
its business and unsurprisingly, banks have been practising risk management 
procedures since then (Meyer, 2000). Indeed, the industry would not have 
survived without it, considering the fact that risk does not always have a 
negative impact rather, it creates opportunities too. However, considering the 
importance of the financial institutions in the well-functioning of the financial 
system, it is implied that such institutions have little, or no, tolerance for loss. 
Therefore, dynamic risk management mechanisms are mandatory, targeting 
efficient allocation of resources; initially financial resources, but ultimately real 
resources, to their most efficient use (Meyer, 2000). Of course, risk management 
LVFRVWO\LQERWKUHVRXUFHVDQGµLQVWLWXWLRQDOGLVUXSWLRQ¶DQG\HWFRVWVRILJQRULQJ
(proper) risk management can have a wide spectrum of tremendous negative 
effects;  from the failure of a particular institution in terms of loss of money or 
reputation, to the failure of the banking system (contagion effect).  
Consequently, understanding and preventing risks from occurring (loss in the 
form of money and reputation) has become a key corporate objective and 
simultaneously, the focus of regulatory frameworks. In doing so, it was 
conventionally believed that organisations should aim to develop a corporate risk 
culture that proactively focuses on company-wide risk management that 
empowers all employees, at all hierarchical levels, to make decisions where 
QHFHVVDU\+RZHYHU%U\FHHWDO  IRXQGHYLGHQFHWKDW µRYHU-reliance on 
employee empowerment and autonomy, as a means by which to improve 
transparency, and risk escalation is no guarantee of a more robust risNIXQFWLRQ¶
(p.24).  This type of strategy is directly linked to OpRisk management and as 
these researchers also argue; failure in education and training can be deemed as 
D µSUHFXUVRU¶ RI SHRSOH ULVN 6XEVHTXHQWO\ VXFK DUJXPHQWV OHDG WR WKH
implication of Blunden and Thirlwell (2010) that state, µMXVWDV ULVN LVDVPXFK
about opportunities as threats, so the people are also the greatest potential 
OLDELOLW\¶SDQG\HWILUPVUDUHO\FRQVLGHUSHRSOHPDQDJHPHQWLQWKHLUULVN
management strategy.  
The deILQLWLRQ RI 2S5LVN KDV EHHQ FULWLFLVHG DV µWRR EURDG¶ DQG LW KDV EHHQ
characterised as the most diverse risk category which justifies the difficulty in 
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limiting the number of dimensions required to describe it. Unsurprisingly, there is 
a lot of dispute amongst academics and professionals about the concept of 
OpRisk, its causes, consequences, characteristics, and management (Moosa, 
2007). In particular reference to the OpRisk management, Blunden (2003) 
argues that OpRisk is as likely to bring a company down as a market collapse, 
while more often than not, failure is generated through misconceptions within 
management control (Moosa, 2007). Martin (2009) argues that major OpRisk 
events demonstrate failures in the organisational culture, with evidence on 
management ignoring indicators and metrics that link to a problem, or turning a 
µEOLQGH\H¶WRDTXHVWLRQDEOHEXVLQHVVSUDFWLFH$VLWZDVLQGLFDWHGLQWKH6RFiété 
Générale 2008 rogue trading scandal, failures in the organisational risk culture 
cause devastating consequences such as; fraud, safety breaches, operational 
disasters, and over leveraging; originating from flaws in uniqe organisational 
cultures (Levy, et al., 2010) and internal controls, that allowed particular risks to 
take root and grow. 
IIF (2009) argue that, for effective risk management to be implemented, 
µFXOWLYDWLRQ¶RIFRQVLVWHQWULVNFXOWXUHLVSHUKDSVWKHPRVWIXQGDPHQWDOWRROZKLOH
risk management is a key tool supporting, particularly, the OpRisk managers to 
accomplish corporate objectives (OeNB & FMA, 2006). They also support that, 
WKHUHLVDFORVHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHILUP¶VVWUDWHJLFRULHQWDWLRQDQGWKHULVN
policy, all of which have a strong impact on corporate culture, and thus on 
values, opinions and attitude of employees. Similarly, OECD (2004) state that 
risk policy is closely related to the corporate strategy, an area of increasing 
importance for boards. The board must decide which risks to transfer and which 
to avoid, while risks, such as operational, can be eliminated through insurance, 
dLYHUVLILFDWLRQ DQG LQWHUQDO FRQWUROV 5LVN SROLF\ DFWV DV D µFUXFLDO JXLGHOLQH¶ IRU
ULVNPDQDJHPHQWLQRUGHUWRDFKLHYHWKHFRPSDQ\¶VGHVLUHGULVNSURILOHWKXVLWV
purpose is to specify the risk appetite of the company (OECD, 2004). According 
to OeNB and FMA (2006), the decisive component in creating a well-balanced 
interaction between these elements is to fully-embrace OpRisk management in 
all employee day-to-GD\ZRUNZKLFKZLOO EHDFKLHYHGE\HQVXULQJ WKDW µSHRSOH
are doing the right thing, at the right WLPH DQG GRLQJ LW FRQVLVWHQWO\ ZHOO¶
(Martin, 2009: p.82). 
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The recent market turbulence proved that effective cultivation of risk culture 
across institutions is the main tool that enables effective risk management (IFF, 
5LVNFXOWXUHUHIHUV WR µWKH norms of behaviour of individuals and groups 
within an organisation that determine the collective ability to identify and 
XQGHUVWDQG RSHQO\ GLVFXVV DQG DFW RQ WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V  current and future 
ULVNV¶,,),QRWKHUZRUGVULVNFXOWXUHDLPVDt establishing a common set 
of values, beliefs, standards and disciplines which define consistent approaches 
to risk-WDNLQJDFURVVWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ7KHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIDµILUP-ZLGHIRFXV¶
on risk is the task of corporate governance. According to IFF (2008) every 
institution should clarify that senior management and particularly, the CEO, are 
responsible for the following risk management procedures; to establish the 
bRDUG¶V HVVHQWLDO RYHUVLJKW UROH LQ ULVN PDQDJHPHQW WR GHYHORS D UREXVW ULVN
culture embeGGHGLQDFFRUGDQFHWRWKHILUP¶VRSHUDWLRQVZKLOHFRYHULQJDOODUHDV
and activities, and to ensure that accountability for risk management is being a 
priority for the whole institution.    
Essentially, organisational culture, its values, and valued behaviours will 
underpin its risk culture (IOR, 2010).  Such behaviour that will provide support 
for an efficient risk management includes; clarity, openness, trust, honesty and 
LQWHJULW\ 7KHVH DWWULEXWHV HQFRXUDJH µFRPSUHKHQVLYH ULVN UHSRUWLQJ¶ ZKLFK
provides a challenge for the senior management in encouraging the reporting of 
(potentially) emerging risks, or already known risks. As Bryce, et al., (2011) 
argue, such information is crucial for the risk measurement and the setting of the 
capital requirements. Moreover, operating within such a culture reduces 
groupthink as people will be aware of potential risks in their operations and it will 
encourage successful decision-PDNLQJ7XUQHUZKRH[DPLQHGWKHµFDXVHV
RI GLVDVWHU¶ LQ DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ DUJXes that implementation of such culture is 
FUXFLDO VLQFH LV UHGXFHV µVORSS\ PDQDJHPHQW¶ In addition, employees at the 
front-row have more knowledge concerning the risks and failures of the 
operations, while senior management is the one responsible for decision making. 
Therefore, iQVWLWXWLRQV VKRXOG EH RSHQ WR µOHDUQLQJ¶ DQG µFKDOOHQJH¶ ZKLOH WKH\
VKRXOGDFFRPPRGDWHDµQREODPH¶FXOWXUHWKDWZLOOHQFRXUDJHUHSRUWLQJRI µQHDU
PLVVHV¶  and failures across the organisation. As IOR (2010) argues, risk 
management is about being aware of WKH ILUP¶VFKDQJLQJ LQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDO
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environment, therefore culture should be one which is active to change and 
continuous improvement in all aspects of risk management.  
Given that the execution of risk management policies involves personnel at every 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDO OHYHO ULVNFXOWXUH LVSODFHG µDW WKHKHDUWRI WKHKXPDQGHFLVLRQV¶
that take place on the routine activities in every organisation, and in every 
hierarchical level. Rationally speaking, it is people that are running the business; 
therefore internal controls, employee incentive schemes, and satisfaction in the 
working environment are vital factors for achieving the corporate objectives. 
Moeller (2007) describes µinternal control¶  DVDSURFHVVDIIHFWHGE\DQHQWLW\¶V
board of directors, management, and other personnel, designed to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in the following 
categories; effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial 
reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations (Moeller, 2007: 
p.4). However, instead of focusing solely on internal controls in relation to 
financial reporting and on the need to have external checks and reporting, as it 
was traditionally conceived, Kirkpatrick (2009) stresses the importance of 
FRQVLGHULQJ LQWHUQDO FRQWUROV DV D µVXEVHW¶ RI ULVNPDQDJHPHQWZKLFK LV D NH\
concern of corporate governance. On the same lines, IOR (2010) proposed a 
comprehensive risk management framework depicting a clear understanding of 
µULVN UROHV DQG UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶ UHSUHVHQWHG E\ WKH µWKUHH OLQHV RI GHIHQFH¶
approach, as shown in Figure 4.   
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Figure 4 The Three Lines of Defence Model 
 
7KLV DSSURDFK RXWOLQHV FRPPRQ µJXLGHOLQHV¶ IRU WKH JRYHUQDQFH RI 2S5LVN
management within financial institutions. The first line-of-defence is concerned 
with the daily risk management in accordance with agreed risk policies, appetite, 
and controls at the operational level (see Section 2.3.1, Figure 2). The second 
line-of-defence deals with the execution of these policies, processes, procedures, 
and controls (see Section 2.3.1, Figure 3). The third line-of-defence is the 
µLQGHSHQGHQW UHYLHZ¶ DXGLW RU ULVN DVVXUDQFH ZKLFK VHUYHV DV D µFKDOOHQJH
IXQFWLRQ¶IRUWKe other two lines-of-defence (BIS, 2011; Bryce, et al., 2013; IOR, 
2010). According to BIS (2011), risk governance of financial institutions should 
be tailored according to their size, business model and its complexity, while the 
implementation of the three lines-of-defence approach varies according to their 
risk management approach, and the flexibility provided by national supervisors. 
The FSA (2011b) comments that a strong risk culture, good communication and 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGDVWURQJVHQVHRIULVNDZDUHQHVVµFDQSURYLGHFRPIRUWZKHQ
XVHGLQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKWKLVDSSURDFK¶S 
In contrast with BCBS (2006), McConnell (2008), and Blunden and Thirlwell 
(2010), Ashby (2008) argues that, WKH µURRW FDXVHV¶ RI PRVW RSHUDWLRQDO loss 
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events are not people, processes, systems or external events, instead, they are 
µRUJDQLVDWLRQDO DQG VRFLDO LQ QDWXUH¶ DQG WKDW, they are the result of multiple 
interrelating factors rather than, a single cause. His argument is based on Turner 
(1976; 1994; 1991)¶V YLHZ RQ GLVDVWHUV XQOHVV GLVDVWHUV DULVH IURP QDWXUDO
forces, they are not created overnight. Additionally, Ashby (2008) suggests that 
OpRisk management is more than a simple loss prevention or financial loss 
reduction through insurance and capital provision, rather, such activities should 
be balanced b\DQ µDSSURSULDWH LQYHVWPHQW LQ UHVLOLHQFH¶, which aims to ensure 
that once losses arise, the organisation is able to accommodate them with the 
minimum amount of cost and disruption. He also supports that it is necessary to 
consider the organisational and social factors that underlie the factors which 
precede a loss event, such as; organisational structure and the associated 
management systems; management risk perceptions; organisational social 
culture and/or social subgroup within the organisation; internal politics and 
power dynamics; organisational change; external, social, political and economic 
pressures. Therefore, despite the alternative views on the causes of OpRisk, he 
concludes thDW ORVVHV DULVH IURP D µFKDLQ RI HYHQWV¶ WKDW HVFDODWH LQ WKH
organisation over time, thus WKHVHORVVHVDUHHVVHQWLDOO\µPDQPDGH¶ 
Martin (2009) argues that at the heart of most OpRisk events it is indicated that 
µSHRSOH IDLOXUH¶ LV DOZD\V WKH SUREOem, raising the question whether OpRisk is 
solely about managing people. Similarly, Blunden and Thirlwell (2010) add that 
OpRisks are ultimately the result of people failure, whether at a strategic, 
managerial, or operational level, by identifying two sides of people risks; 
employees and their managers. They explain that employees are essentially 
honest, however, factors such as lack of competence, training experience, and 
personal or domestic environment (i.e. relationships, health, economic condition) 
can potentially affect their behaviour and hence, their reliability. Additionally, 
WKH\ VXSSRUW WKDW VLQFH LW LV GLIILFXOW WR DVVHVV WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V H[SRVXUH WR
people-related risks, EHFDXVH SHRSOH¶V SHUVRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV FKDQJH
continuously, it is necessary to effectively manage employee risk. This 
VXJJHVWLRQLVGLUHFWO\OLQNHGWRWKHµRWKHUVLGHRISHRSOHULVN¶± managers.  
According to Blunden and Thirlwell (2010), the greatest challenges of 
PDQDJHPHQW DUH WR µUHWDLQ WKH EHVW SHRSOH DQG WKDW DOO SHUIRUP WR their best 
DELOLW\¶ ZKLFK FDQ EH SRVVLEO\ WDFNOHG E\ HVWDEOLVKLQJ WKH ULJKW HQYLURQPHQW
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ZKLFK ZLOO LQFOXGH FODULILFDWLRQ RI WKH PHDQLQJ RI µH[FHOOHQFH¶ DQG µJRRG
SHUIRUPDQFH¶ WKDW ZLOO GHILQH WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQDO FXOWXUH OHDGHUVKLS DQG
hierarchical clarification; openness and transparency; effective management, and 
change and flexibility. As a subsequent result of the GFC, Martin (2009) suggests 
WKDWWKHUHLVDQHHGIRUVHQLRUPDQDJHPHQWWRµVHWDJRRGH[DPSOH¶DVWUDWHJ\
which clearly failed during the recent crisis. Undoubtedly, establishing an 
effective corporate governance and risk management structure is very 
challenging for the senior managers, however as the FSA (2011b) advices them, 
the key considerations are firm-wide behaviour, engagement, and risk culture, 
which are the direct and active ingredients to support them.  
Furthermore, Blunden and Thirlwell (2010) support that once the right 
environment is established, people risks can be mitigated through the selection 
process, appraisal and performance management, training and development, 
reward system, staff retention and succession planning. Meyer (2000) suggests 
that when developing risk management procedures, managers should focus on 
developing and/or attracting personnel with the skills required applying risk 
management tools meaningfully. Therefore, HR department plays a substantial 
role in the organisation, while active support is required for HR experts to resolve 
µODFNRIWUDLQLQJ¶RU µXQGHUVWDIILQJ¶0F&RQQHOODGGVWKDWWHFKQLTXHVVXch 
as Six Sigma, and KRIs in conjunction with HR, are essential mechanisms to 
XQFRYHU µRSHUDWLRQDO TXDOLW\¶ LH HPSOR\HH VDWLVIDFWLRQWXUQRYHU HWF DQG
subsequently, to alert OpRisk managers by revealing problematic areas. 
McConnell (2008) concluded that people risks cannot be controlled by a single 
discipline due to its diverse scope. Therefore, he suggested that well-trained 
OpRisk managers should reach out to other disciplines, in particular; HR, 
compliance and strategic planning, to cooperate in effHFWLYHO\HQFRPSDVVLQJµWKH
IXOOGHDUWKRISHRSOHULVN¶6LPLODUO\$VKE\VXSSRUWVWKDWWKHUHDUHPDQ\
useful lessons to be learned from other sectors in providing solutions to enhance 
the effectiveness of OpRisk management frameworks in the financial industry. 
Bryce et al. (Forthcoming) stress the importance of qualitative and quantitative 
training, and educational development perspective. They found evidence that, 
both attitude and information uncertainty endorsed by training and education on 
risk management process and procedures can potentially act as fundamental 
building blocks of a coherent and effective risk culture, and therefore risk 
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management strategy. Additionally, Martin (2009) and McConnell (2008) suggest 
that to be effective, OpRisk managers DUHUHTXLUHGWRSXUVXHDµOHDGHUVKLSUROH¶
within the business, with acquired status and authority to provide guidance when 
required and also, to cease any inappropriate actions when uncovered. He adds 
that communication should be embedded within the whole business, and carried 
by the OpRisk managers by their on-site presence, emphasising the importance 
of face-to-face communication. However, success requires non-executives to 
have a clear understanding of the organizational structure, culture and risk 
profile, which can be achieved through training on risk matters, and company 
orientation (Martin, 2009).  
Martin (2009) also stresses the importance of the role of remuneration policies in 
incentivizing particular types of behaviour. For example, recent instances have 
shown that, in contrast to the long-term profitability, short-term remuneration 
SROLFLHV LH YROXPH DQG WXUQRYHU HQFRXUDJH µPLVDOLJQHG LQFHQWLYHV¶ EHWZHHQ
WKH ILUP¶VREMHFWLYHVDQG LWVPDQDJHUV  A vast body of evidence (Cihák, et al., 
2013; MF&RQQHOO 	 %ODFNHU  $VKE\  VXSSRUWV WKDW µPLVDOLJQHG
LQFHQWLYHV¶ LV RQH RI WKH IXQGDPHQWDO FDXVHV RI WKH*)& DV LW KDV HQFRXUDJHG
bank managers to keenly boost short-term profits and create banks WKDWDUHµWRR
ELJ WR IDLO¶ regulators to tolerate withhold information from other equally 
important parties and, credit rating agencies to falsely rate subprime assets. 
&LKiN HW DO  UHFRPPHQG µLQFHQWLYH DXGLWV¶ DV D SRWHQWLDO VROXWLRQ WR
identify incentive misalignments in the financial industry and hence, mitigate 
systemic risks. Particularly, the aim of their research is to µUH-RULHQW¶ ILQDQFLDO
regulation towards the aim of addressing incentives on an on-going basis. 
)XUWKHU0H\HUVWUHVVHVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIµPDNLQJULVNPDWWHUWRRZQers 
DQGPDQDJHUV¶ZKLOHVXggesting specific prerequisites to encourage them to pay 
attention to risk. These prerequisites include effective risk assessment and 
management, which require solid accounting and disclosure standards to induce 
bankers and insurers to make accurate customer performance screening. In 
addition, due to the importance of trustworthiness, accuracy is further reinforced 
by DXGLWLQJV\VWHPVDQG OHJDOSHQDOWLHV IRUSURYLGLQJ µIUDXGXOHQWRUPLVOHDGLQJ¶
information. In consequence, staff with sufficient expertise in identifying, 
evaluating and managing such risks is necessary. The DEVHQFH RI µLPSOLFLW RU
H[SOLFLW JRYHUQPHQW JXDUDQWHHV¶ on job security is an additional prerequisite, 
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where the fear of losing their job, as a result of merger and acquisitions, acts as 
an incentive to manage risk and avoid insolvency. Similarly, for market discipline 
to be effective, FUHGLWRUV VKRXOG µIHDU¶ UXQ RQ ULVN RI ORVV RQ WKHLU FODLPV RQ
banks, to incentivise banks to control such risks. Of course, to maintain market 
GLVFLSOLQH µDGHTXDWH DFFRXQWLQJ¶ DQG µGLVFORVXUH VWDQGDUGV¶ WR HQDEOH LQYHVWRUV¶
MXGJPHQWRQEDQN¶V FRQGLWLRQDUH UHTXLUHG which necessitates regulatory bank 
supervision (Meyer, 2000). Still, accurate DVVHVVPHQW RQ EDQNV¶ FRQGLWLRQ
authority to close down insolvent banks, and remove inefficient management are 
essential to impose control on the executives and the board, thus depicting the 
importance of government intervention. 
In effect, lack of effective market discipline was apparent during the recent GFC. 
&LKiNHWDOH[SODLQWKLVSKHQRPHQRQDVDUHVXOWRI µKHUGLQJEHKDYLRXU¶
DQGµPRUDOKD]DUG¶ERWKRIZKLFKGRPLQDWHGWKHJOREDOPDUNHWV(YLGHQWO\SULRU
to the crisis, managers of large financial institutions had expressed hazardous 
EHKDYLRXU DV D UHVXOW RI EHLQJ WUHDWHG DV µWRR-big-to-IDLO¶ LQVWLWXWLRQV HQMR\LQJ
favourable regulatory treatment (Rajan, 2010; Ötker-Robe, et al., 2011; 
Goldstein & Véron, 2011; World Bank, 2012). This implies that solvency of these 
institutions was guaranteed, because a failure of such institutions poses systemic 
failures in the markets. Therefore, managers were incentivised to undertake 
aggressive strategies irrespective of the associated risks to boost their profits, 
hence emphasising Meyer (200¶V SUHUHTXLVLWH FRQGLWLRQV Other examples of 
moral hazard behaviour inhibiting in the financial sector include; agents falsifying 
documents, and lying to people about the real cost of the mortgages as a result 
of information asymmetry.  
According to McConnell and Blacker (2011), in the definition of OpRisk, losses 
UHVXOWLQJ IURP LQVWDQFHV RI PRUDO KD]DUG ZRXOG EH FODVVLILHG DV µSHRSOH ULVN¶
SDUWLFXODUO\ XQGHU WKH µHYHQW W\SH FDWHJRU\¶ RI µFOLHQWV SURGXFWV DQG EXVLQHVV
SUDFWLFHV¶ 0F&RQQHOO  DUJXHV WKDW WKH GHILQLWLRQ FRYHUV µSHRSOH ULVN¶
beyond such intentional misbehaviours, such as; incompetence (i.e. use of 
inappropriate models), negligence (i.e. lack of appropriate action), lack of 
knowledge, usually resulting from improperly trained staff, or lack of experience 
and, lack of accountability resulting from ill-defined responsibilities and 
aggression (i.e. improper use of power). Unfortunately, these risks are hardly 
LGHQWLILHG EHWZHHQ WKHP DQG LQ PDQ\ VLWXDWLRQV µLGHQWLFDO EHKDYLRXU E\ DQ
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individual (usually junior) can result in dismissal, but be tolerated if perpetrated 
E\DQRWKHUPRUHVHQLRU LQGLYLGXDO¶0F&RQQHOO	%ODFNHUS+LVWRU\
has also revealed that, negligence towards inappropriate behaviour, leads to 
unethical actions, and subsequently, to illegal activities which end up into in 
severe losses (see Barings, National Australia Bank and Daiwa).  
Further, evidence has shown that in most of these cases, managers were aware 
of theLULQIHULRUV¶ illegal actions, however no action was taken when these actions 
were highly profitable. This is a common feature of rogue trading. In his 
interview, Nick Leeson admitted that although a rogue trader is a criminal, the 
underlying bank is also partly to blame, as such an event indicates the failings of 
the organisation and its flaws in its operations (cited in Watkins, 2013). Others 
argue that ZKHUHµWKHERVVHVNQHZ¶, rogue traders may be dismissed. As Watkins 
(2013) argue, the role that banks play in fostering rogues is to do with corporate 
culture. In support of his statement, Turner (1976) states that rarely an 
individual or a single error has the potential of creating a disasterous outcome in 
D ILHOGZKLFK LVEHOLHYHGWREH µVHFXUHG¶XQOHVV µXQZLWWLQJDVVLVWDQFH¶ LVRIIHUHG
by access to the resources of large organisations, and time. If this is the case 
then it is implied that organisational culture is inefficient. Hence, these events 
highlight the need for a better understanding and control of OpRisk, while they 
draw attention to the likelihood to fall victim to fraudulent employee in any 
organisation with poor supervision and management.  
It is apparent that the losses incurred during the GFC exhibit perfectly all the 
possible dimensions of people risk. Kirkpatrick (2009) stresses that failures and 
weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements are largely responsible for 
the outburst of the crisis, since they fail to control against excessive risk-taking 
in a number of financial institutions. This was the result of failures in information 
flow about risk exposures across the organisational hierarchies, while it was 
HYLGHQW WKDWULVNPDQDJHPHQWZDVRIWHQ µDFWLYLW\-based rather than enterprise-
EDVHG¶ZKLFKPHDQWWKDWNH\ULVNVZHUHXQLGHQWLILHGDQGLQHIIHFWLYHO\PDQDJHG
Additional failures include; non-disclosures about foreseeable risk factors, lack of 
monitoring and risk management systems, insufficient accounting standards and 
regulatory requirements, and misaligned remuneration systems. Since setting, 
reviewing and guiding risk policy is a key function of the board, these 
malfunctions signify ineffective corporate governance (Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
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Dedu, et al. (2011) conducted a behavioural approach to the financial crisis using 
the three-pillar-DSSURDFKLQRUGHUWRH[DPLQHWKHµFROODSVHRIHWKLFDOEHKDYLRXU¶
and its role in finance in terms of, studying, regulating, and assessing financial 
risks. They concluded that regulatory accords will be more effective if they 
integrate biases of human behaviour in their frameworks, as will enable people to 
become less µILQDQFLDOO\YXOQHUDEOH¶,QDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHILQGLQJVRI0F&RQQHOO
& Blacker (2011),  Dedu, et al. (2011) detected the following behavioural factors 
(under pillar 1); optimism, wishful thinking, overconfidence, greed 
(salaries/bonuses), regret, pessimism, apathy (i.e. passing the responsibility), 
herding-groupthink, anchoring, representativeness biases, loyalty to the firm, 
and informational cascades. Then, they examined the collapse of ethical 
behaviour that led to the GFC such as, predatory lending practices, inappropriate 
compensation schemes, rating agencies behaviour, corporate governance 
reforms and financial institutions opacity in their reporting (pillar 2). Finally, 
SLOODUSUHVHQWVWKHµPLVPDQDJHPHQWRIULVNDQGUHJXODWLRQV¶0RUHRYHU$VKE\
(2009) in his µ5HVSRQVHWR7XUQHU5HYLHZ¶UHFRPPHQGVWKDW, in order for financial 
institutions to be better prepared when crises occur and be able to prevent them, 
the regulatory focus should be upon raising risk management standards, and 
creating the right incentives for managers and stakeholders. He also argues that, 
LQ RUGHU IRU WKH DOO WKH UHJXODWRUV LQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ WR EH SDUW RI WKH µVROXWLRQ¶
they should develop regulatory responses that simultaneously enhance the 
effectiveness of market forces within the financial services sector, and 
board/management decision-making, rather than, working against them. 
To sum up, people are the heart of every organisation hence it is their individual 
and collective actions and behaviours that generate organisational results. 
However, given that actions and behaviours can be influenced by countless of 
factors, organisational culture becomes a necessary tool in controlling this 
random behaviour. In this case, the root cause analysis of severe past events is 
valuable, as it generates lessons to be learned and raises awareness of past 
behaviour and actions enabling practitioners to avoid them, whenever possible. 
Furthermore, considering the diverse nature of OpRisk and the highly correlated 
set of risks that originate distinctively across the whole organisational hierarchy, 
it is no surprise that cultural risk dominated the discussion. Subsequently, when 
referring to OpRisk, corporate culture, and more precisely risk culture, is the 
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main component of the overarching term which essentially refers to employees. 
The management of such a ubiquitous risk is a managerial task and must be 
performed on a broad organisational basis with the support of senior managers, 
and through successful communication and information flow across every 
organisational department. However, prior to dealing with OpRisk, people risk 
has to be understood and people management to be implemented with the aid of 
several supportive control functions, particularly; audit, supervision, effective 
communication, µno blame¶ culture, financial reporting and HR. 
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2.6 People Risk Framework 
Defining people risk is very challenging due to its diversified nature and its 
unpredictability as it is heavily based on human behaviour. In fact, there is a gap 
in the literature in defining and addressing people risk directly. Even regulators 
KDYHEHHQµUHWLFHQW¶LQGHILQLQJSUHFLVHO\ZKDWµSHRSOHULVN¶FRYHUVDQGZLWKRXWD
FOHDUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVSHRSOHULVNWKHUHLVRQO\ µOLWWOHKRSH¶ LQ
defining, assessing, and mitigating such risks. For this reason, firms are unable 
to take the appropriate measures to mitigate people risks, affecting the capital 
requirements left aside to cover unexpected operational risk events, required by 
Basel II/III. Many authors have tried to explain people risk by addressing various 
types of human behaviour that may cause negative effects on the organisation, 
while others, indirectly address people risk through organisational culture which 
impacts employee behaviour (see Section 2.5).  
However, these definitions concentrate on internal people risk, and as McConnell 
(2008) argues, clearly the definition of Basel II on people risk refers to external 
risk factors too. Thus, he stresses the importance of considering the external 
risks that arise due to unethical or illegal activities across the industry when 
dealing with OpRisk management. External people risk factors most commonly 
occur from customer behaviour, such as, falsified information provided by the 
customers in terms of, their credit profile upon entering a contract, counterparty 
default risks and, the risk of customers lying when submitting insurance claims. 
Therefore, broadly speaking, µSHRSOHULVN¶FRXOGEHGHILQHGDVDQ\organisational 
failure, or deficiency, that can be potentially caused and/or originated by a 
human, including, internal or external human actions or non-actions. 
Despite the lack of empirical literature on people risk, McConnell (2008) has 
made a substantial contribution to the academic literature by proposing that, in 
order to understand people risk; it is essential to understand its boundaries. His 
argument is that, without an understanding of these boundaries, critical risks 
may (involuntarily) be neglected while OpRisk managers may lack the necessary 
skills to fully comprehend it. Thus, being unable to suggest appropriate 
mitigation techniques, and subsequently, being unable to calculate the relative 
risks comprising OpRisks, a procedure which is essential for accurate setting of 
the capital requirements. Therefore, in order to capture these boundaries, he 
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constracted a µJHQHULF¶ People Risk Framework (Figure 5) with the aim of 
identifying and clarifying the scope of people risk. In this theoretical framework 
he goes beyond the hierarchical level suggested by Blunden and Thirlwell (2010), 
by arguing that people risks can be considered as occurring within four dinstinct, 
escalating areas:  
1. Incident: how do people, especially employees, react when an unforeseen 
µLQFLGHQW´VXFKDVWKHSURFHVVLQJRIDQLQFRUUHFWWUDQVDFWLRn, occurs? 
 
2. Individual: how does an individual (or a small group of individuals) behave 
with respect to their responsibilities (such as, representations made to 
customers with regard to the properties of a particular financial product (i.e. 
mortgages)? 
 
3. Institution: how does the firm behave with respect to the behaviour of the 
individuals whom it employs, and with whom it deals (for example, turning a 
blind eye to profitable, but suspect, transactions)? 
 
4. Industry: how does the industry as a whole behave (for example, emulating 
one another in structuring and selling dangerous, potentially illegal, products 
and services)? 
(McConnell, 2008: p.373) 
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Figure 5 People Risk Framework (McConnell, 2008) 
 
McConnell (2008) argues that when cosidering people risk and how to manage it, 
a key aspect is WKH µLQWHQWLRQ¶ RI WKH SHRSOH LQYROYHG :KHQ DQ LQFLGHQW LV
µXQH[SHFWHG¶LWLVUDUHO\WKHLQWHQWLRQRIWKHSHRSOH, rather, it is usually a result 
of lack of knowledge, experience, training or plain error. At the individual and 
institution level, risky activities can be classified as intentional, with the people 
involved being aware of the consequences of their actions, or unintentional, 
where adverse outcomes can result from ignorance or inexperience. He then 
identified three types of LQWHQWLRQDOµPLVEHKDYLRXU¶, which adverse outcomes can 
result from: 
o Illegal: an individual intentionally breaks the law i.e. theft, insider trading, 
market abuse 
o Unethical: unethical within the bounds of the law, but unacceptable in 
normal business, such as, failing to provide all information upon which to 
make an investment decision 
o Inappropriate: unacceptable behavior such as aggressive sales techniques. 
However, these types of misbehaviour can rarely be identified due to the blurred 
lines between them (McConnell, 2008; McConnell & Blacker, 2011; 2012). 
This framework has impacted substantially the OpRisk literature, as it has 
introduced people risk as an emerging standalone area in this research field. In 
fact, following McConnell¶s article on people risk (People Risk: Where are the 
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Boundaries?, 2008) DGGLWLRQDO DXWKRUV VWDUWHG UHIHUULQJ WR µSHRSOH ULVN¶ LQ WKHLU
academic papers, including; (Martin, 2009; McConnell & Blacker, 2011; 2012; 
Bryce, et al., 2013, etc.). However, despite the immense role that the People 
Risk Framework has played in the empirical literature around this niche area, this 
framework is based on theoretical arguments, while any empirical proof about its 
applicability in practice is absent. Therefore, it is anticipated that this paper will 
capture this gap in this niche body of literature.  
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3. Methodology and Data Collection 
3.1. Introduction 
The following section will explain the method used in order to conduct the 
research, while it will provide a descriptive analysis of the data collection 
process, the sample, and the analysis technique. 
3.2. Aims and Objectives 
The central focus of this paper is to to test the validity of the People Risk 
Framework using the FSAFN as evidence, while generating new knowlegde 
surrounding people risk. The investigation will seek to identify human behaviour 
in the FSAFN and correlate it with the framework, to examine whether human 
activites exist under each of its constituting dimensions. In the absence of 
guidelines on people risk management in the financial services regulatory 
framework, it is anticipated that such an investigation would provide crucial 
insights on whether this framework can be used by firms in real life to tackle the 
impact of people risk in financial institutions that, may potentially be useful in 
setting OpRisk capital more accurately. The paper also aims to provide 
recommendations for future research and implications for the organisational and 
regulatory practice. 
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3.3. Method 
In order to achieve the aims and objectives of this paper, a qualitative content 
analysis will be conducted. This method is defined as, a research method for the 
subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic 
classification process of coding, and identifying themes or patterns, that 
contribute to the provision of knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon 
under study (Downe-Wamboldt, 1992; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Additionally, it 
consists of three types of approaches, however, this study will implement the 
direct approach, which aims to µYDOLGDWH, or extend conceptually, a theoretical 
IUDPHZRUNRUWKHRU\¶Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This approach is often associated 
with the deductive category application approach in which, relationships amongst 
the variables assist in determining relationships within the coding scheme 
(Mayring, 2000). Therefore, the study will implement a direct deductive content 
analysis by embedding the documented data derived from the FSAFN into the 
People Risk Framework. 
According to Hsieh and Shannon (2005), this type of analysis follows a structured 
process; initially key concepts/variables are identified using the existing theory, 
and then, operational definitions for each category are determined using the 
theory. In this case, the four dimensions of the framework are going to be used 
WR LGHQWLI\SHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXU in the FSAFN. Since the data used is secondary, 
the process will VWDUWZLWK µFRGLQJ¶ LPPHGLDWHO\ZLWK WKH SUHGHWHUPLQHG FRGHV, 
i.e. identify the data immediately under each category. The findings from such an 
analysis may offer supporting or non-supportive evidence for the theory. 
Additionally, the existing theory will guide the discussion of findings, which is the 
main strength of this approach, as it allows theory to be expanded or supported 
conveniently (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Its implementation has also some 
µLQKHUHQWOLPLWDWLRQV¶LQWKDW, researchers approach the data with an informed, yet 
strong bias, which induces practisioners to be more likely to find supportive 
evidence, rather than non-supportive, of the theory. According to Lincoln and 
Guba (1985), these limitations are UHODWHG WR µQHXWUDOLW\¶ RU µFRQIRUPDELOLW\ RI
WUXVWZRUWKLQHVV¶DVDSDUDOOHOFRQFHSWWRREMHFWLYLW\   
Moreover, although WKLV LV QRW WKH ILUVW WLPH WKH IUDPHZRUN¶V H[LVWHQFH LV
acknowledged in academic papers (see McConnell and Blacker, 2011; 2012), this 
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current paper will evaluate the strength of this framework. Essentially, this is the 
first time that the People Risk Framework is being examined in a research paper, 
justifying the absence of public sources related to it. Maxwell (1992) argues that 
the legitimacy of qualitative research is crucial and that if qualitative studies 
cannot consistently produce valid results, then recommendations based on these 
studies cannot be relied on. This is why it is important to test the validity of the 
framework, indicating the contribution of this study to the existing literature.  
Further, although the FSAFN have been used in research previously (see Ring et 
al., Forthcoming; Turner, 2005), to the DXWKRU¶VNQRZOHGJHnot only it is the first 
time that such an investigation is conducted, but also, it is the first time that 
people risk is investigated in conjunction with the FSAFN. Distinctively, this 
particular dataset contains detailed examples of specific operational failures 
describing the loss event in detail, allowing relevant data to be collected 
effectively. It also consists of a wide-range of operational failures, allowing 
conclusions to be drawn from an examination of a broader range of operational 
loss events. This originality also signifies the contribution of this research paper. 
In essence, the FSAFN are fines issued by the FSA as a result of some illegal 
action, organizational failure, or regulatory compliance misalignment. The FSA 
uses µSXEOLFFHQVXUH¶WKURXJKWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRIthe FSAFN as DµPHDQV¶E\ZKLFK 
the regulator can communicate poor behaviour to the regulatory community, 
while expecting an improved conduct from regulated individuals and institutions 
(Turner, 2005; Ring, et al., Forthcoming). This is why the FSA considers it as a 
more serious crime when the underlying breached Principle is related to a failure, 
already being known within the sector. Moreover, through the identification of 
regulatory breaches, the dataset enables comparison amongst the cases, thus 
providing a sound dataset of operational loss events, suitable in examining the 
effect of people risk in the UK financial institutions. Lastly, given the business 
sensitivity relative to their failings and the information inadequacy generally 
SURYLGHG E\ PDUNHW SDUWLFLSDQWV UHODWLYH WR WKHVH IDLOLQJV µWKH )6$)1 SURYLGH
richness, transparency and robustness far beyond anything else that exists 
FXUUHQWO\¶(Ring, et al., Forthcoming: p.11).  
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3.4. Source 
The FSAFN were obtained from the official FSA website6. Unlike the data sourced 
from organisations themselves which are usually subjective, and exposed to 
biasness, this source is considered to be free from such deficiencies. Given that 
this is the FSA official website, and an independent body from that of the 
institutions themselves, it is assumed that the documented data is trustworthy, 
objective, unbiased, complete and of a good quality (Bowen, 2005). Yet, it is 
subject to questionable accuracy and liability attached to the nature of such 
secondary data. Nevertheless, the )6$)1 IROORZD µFRQVLVWHQWDQGVWDQGDUGLVHG
format in tone, framing, and content, thus allowing for ease in compatibility and 
data exWUDFWLRQ¶Ring, et al., Forthcoming: p.12). It should be also noted that, 
since the data gathered fall within several distinctive years, it may not accurately 
reflect the continuously changing regulation that is in effect today.   
3.5. Sample Criteria 
With the purpose of acquiring relevant and more accurate results, it was decided 
to examine large institutions, which their impact in the financial industry is more 
significant than smaller institutions. For this reason, one of the main criteria for 
the final notices to be included, or excluded, in the sample was for the imposed 
fine to amount to £1million or above, while the period of interest was the post-
crisis period that is, from 1st of January 2008 to 31st of December 2012. 
Additionally, since the aim of the study is to examine people risk within banks 
and insurance firms, the cases were then filtered accordingly. With regards to the 
latter criterion, an institution was considered to be a bank or an insurance firm if 
the name of the fined institution was included either, in the list of registered 
banks 7 , or in the list of registered insurers 8 . Where it was necessary, the 
Financial Services Register9 was used, in order to accurately assess whether the 
institution was a bank or an insurance firm.   
The only implication associated with the data selection was that some of the 
imposed fines were discounted, usually by 30% due to an agreement, usually of 
                                                             
6
 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/notices/final 
7
 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/other_publications/banks/2010 
8
 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/consumerinformation/product_news/insurance/employers_liability/table 
9
 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/register/home.do 
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an early settlement, resulting to an actual payment of less than £1million, i.e. 
original fine amounted to £1million, but the actual payment was £700,000. 
Hence, since the original fine was within the selection criterion, such discounted 
fines were included in the sample.  
3.6. Data 
The total number of the FSAFN that satisfied all three criteria was 34, totalling to 
£396,685,000 in fines. Figure 6 below depicts an upward trend of the number of 
these cases during the 5-year period and the total number of cases per year, 
while Figure 7 depicts the total amount of fines per year. The upward movement 
that both figures depict can be explained by the fact that the FSA had imposed 
stricter measures after the GFC and the run on the Northern Rock in 2007. 
Inevitably, these incidents have put the )6$µXQGHUILUH¶, since they indicated the 
UHJXODWRU\ ERG\¶V IDLOLQJV WR DGGUHVV GHILFLHQFLHV ZLWKLQ WKH ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP
(Allen & Overy, 2013). This phenomenon also justifies the regulatory reformation 
RIWKHµWULSDUWLWHV\VWHP¶, and the recent transformation of the FSA to FCA.  
 
Figure 6 Number of FSAFN per year 
 
47 
 
Figure 7 Total Amount of Fines per year 
 
 
3.7. Descriptive Analysis 
,QLWLDOO\ WKH VHOHFWHG FDVHV ZHUH UHDG LQ RUGHU WR µIDFLOLWDWH LPPHUVLRQ LQ WKH
WRSLF¶(Ring, et al. Forthcoming), while constructing a table in order to gain an 
insight of the cases, and the types of operational loss events. Appendix 1 briefly 
describes the financial losses of the institutions constituting the sample, and 
shows the Principle(s) breached in each case (detailed explanation of all the 
breaches is found in Appendix 2). The most common types of operational losses 
ZHUH UHODWHG WR µ8QIDLU &XVWRPHU 7UHDWPHQW¶, including asset-mispricing and 
unsuitable advice given to customers. Rogue trading and market abuse were 
amongst the most serious breaches, accompanied by the most expensive 
financial penalties. However, the utmost serious breach was the misconduct 
relating to the calculation of LIBOR and EURIBOR which was conducted by UBS 
AG (Case 23) and Barclays Bank Plc (Case 30), amounting to £160,000,000 and 
£59,500,000, respectively, in fines. The cases indicated that almost all of the 
people-related failures were a result of corporate culture inefficiencies, which 
bring to the surface managerial failures regarding the implementation of a 
successful culture with strong internal controls to avoid intentional, or 
unintentional actions. Remarkably, 24 out of 34 cases involve a breach of 
3ULQFLSOHZKLFKUHIHUV WREUHDFKHVUHJDUGLQJ µ0DQDJHPHQWDQG&RQWURO¶This 
analogy stresses the importance of management and internal controls within an 
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organisation and indicates that any inefficiencies occurring within management 
and control inevitably, result in operational losses. Those cases that were not 
involved in breaches of Principle 3, they also involved inadequate control systems 
and management failures (Principle 2 and 9, Appendix 2), thus indicating 
corporate culture failures which the senior managers and the board of directors 
are responsible for.  
3.8. Data Collection and Analysis Technique 
With the purpose of constructing a table summarising information enclosed in the 
FSAFN in relation to each of the dimensions in the framework, the cases were 
read for the second time. 7KH JRDO ZDV WR LGHQWLI\ SHRSOH¶V DFWLRQV and find 
correlation where possible, with the four distinctive dimensions of the framework, 
as indicated in Appendix 3. However, it was noted that FSAFN mostly referred to 
WKH)LUPDVDµSHUVRQ¶, under Section 206 of the Act10, with limited reference to 
specific individuals, such as staff, senior management, or board of directors. 
Therefore, the strategy implemented to collect the appropriate information for 
each dimension is described below: 
Incident: The information sought was related to the failure on the surface 
of the operational loss. For example, there were instances that failure occurred 
from an unexpected error (i.e. system or reporting error).  In other cases, 
failures persisted in the organisation and they were only revealed after the )6$¶V
investigation, including unrevealed system design, and process failures.  Other 
situations considered under µincident¶ include, organisational risks rising from 
inadequate systems and controls.  
Individual: Information related to staff behaviour was sought and it was 
judged whether it was intentional or unintentional. Possible reasons for employee 
behaviour were also recorded, for example, whether this was a result of training, 
supervision, or incentive schemes failure. 
 
                                                             
10
 Section 206 of the Act states:
  
If the Authority considers that an authorised person has contravened a 
requirement imposed on him by, or under this Act ?ŝƚŵĂǇŝŵƉŽƐĞŽŶŚŝŵĂƉĞŶĂůƚǇ ?ŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞ
contravention, of such an amount as it considers appropriate.
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Institution: Any information related to organisational failures and 
inefficiencies ZHUH UHSRUWHG XQGHU WKH FDWHJRU\ RI µLQVWLWXWLRQ¶ Failures of 
management and actions of employees in the higher hierarchy were considered 
to be institutional losses, while any failures addressing the name of the 
institution were considered to be managerial losses. 
Industry: The type of information that was sought was related to the 
impact of losses of the firm in the wider market. For example, this includes the 
impact on PDUNHWFRQILGHQFHZLWKUHJDUGVWRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VVL]HLQWKHLQGXVWU\ 
Finally, with the information gathered from this process, the table in Appendix 3 
was constructed, which was the main table used to conduct the analysis. 
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4. Findings 
4.1. Introduction 
Even though it was expected that one case will cover all of the four dimensions in 
the framework, it was indicated that not all of them satisfied all the categories 
(Cases: 1, 8, 11, 17, 24, 28, 29, 31, 33). It was discovered that in fact, it is very 
challenging to correlate the evidence with the framework, particularly, because 
the FSAFNs rarely provide description on employee actions and behaviour.  In 
order for the data and the content analysis to be valid, consistency plays a major 
role. However, although the FSAFN are relatively consistent, a slight change 
amongst the cases across the 5 years was noticed in that, the more recent cases 
were more detailed than the older ones. This was also indicated by their number 
of pages on average; the older cases had around 15 pages whereas the newer 
ones had around 23 pages or above. This was an important implication in the 
study as the detailed descriptions allowed more relevant information to be 
collected, which explains why the older cases acquire less information in the 
table. This section will provide a discussion on findings on each of the four 
dimensions distinctively, followed by an evaluation of the framework as a whole.
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4.2. Incident 
0F&RQQHOOGHVFULEHVWKDWµLQFLGHQW¶UHODWHVWRWKHHPSOR\HHDFWLRQVZKHQ
DQ µXQIRUHVHHQ¶ LQFLGHQW RFFXUV Surprisingly, the analysis indicated that in 
almost all of the cases, neither employees at the operational level, nor senior 
staff acted, or reacted, WRWKHµXQIRUHVHHQ¶LQFLGHQWLQDQHIILFLHQWDQGDSSURSULDWH
manner. The analysis has also shown that failures were not always discovered or 
recognised by the people within the organisation. Instead, they were incubating 
along the organisation unnoticed. For instance; in Case 6, the rogue trader used 
to hide losses in his trading book amounting to $96million, which were revealed 
only after he became redundant. Inevitably, in such cases, no action was taken 
due to the ignorance of the state of events. Similarly, in Case 14, uncovered 
ongoing failures came into surface only after the data loss incident. Notably, in 
most of the cases, failures occurred as a result of undiscovered process failures 
usually at the operational level, rather than unexpected incidents, i.e. failures 
resulted from the sales process design that encouraged sales advisers to follow 
µDVVXPSWLYH¶ VHOOLQJ WHFKQLTXHV (Cases: 1, 3, 5), and to provide insufficient 
information to customers, exposing them in the risk of making decisions based 
on incomplete or inaccurate information (Cases: 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 33).  
Although such activities are considered inappropriate, it is expected that front 
row employees will not recognise them as inappropriate, since they are part of 
their daily activities, and it is simply how they are trained to do their job. 
Consequently, it is through the monitoring and supervision that these failures are 
expected to be revealed. In fact, as indicated in Appendix 4, the incident or the 
failures were recognised internally in only 10 out of the 34 cases in the sample, 
while only in 4 of those cases, people at the operational level escalated the 
information about the failures across the hierarchy (Cases: 4, 17, 20, 23). Yet, 
even when the information was escalated at the senior level, managers failed to 
take appropriate actions and mitigate failures and risks. For example, in Case 4, 
a system error resulted into asset mispricing, however, lack of fast information 
IORZ UHVXOWHG LQWR µUHDFWLYH¶ GHFLVLRQ-making, exposing customers in the 
insurance market, causing further compliance failures (i.e. unfair customer 
treatment). Hence, revealing that, WKH ILUP¶V FRUH YDOXH ZDV not to treat 
customers fairly. This inciGHQW FDQ EH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK 0F&RQQHOO ¶V
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argument that losses from unexpected events (system error) rarely result from 
the intention of the people involved to act in a way that causes a loss, but rather, 
factors such as lack of knowledge, plain errors or stress of their job (managerial 
decision) induce them tRPDNHµEDGGHFLVLRQV¶LQGLFDWLQJ poorly defined culture). 
Alternatively, if the institution had operated in a manner that its core values and 
LWVFXOWXUHDUHERWKDOLJQHGZLWKWKH)6$¶VUHTXLUHPents, and if any action taken 
these values were taken into consideration, LW ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ µDOPRVW¶
LPSRVVLEOH WKDW VXFK D µUHDFWLYH¶ GHFLVLRQ ZRXOG KDYH been taken. Therefore, 
although it may be considered that false decisions usually result from operating 
under stress and pressure, thus they are not intentional, generally, they reveal 
DQµLOO-GHILQHG¶FXOWXUH 
,QVXSSRUWRI0F&RQQHOO¶VVWDWHPHQWWKHFDVHVUHYHDOHGWKDWµH[SHULHQFH¶SOD\VD
crucial role when it comes to handling of an unforeseen incident. Case 6 
indicated that rogue trading losses remained unrevealed largely as a 
FRQVHTXHQFHRIµXQH[SHFWHGVWDIIWXUQRYHU¶ZKLFKUHVXOWHGLQWRWKHULVHRIIDLOXUHV
derived from inexperienced staff and lack of knowledge on selling products. Case 
31 provides an even stronger example of the importance of having experienced 
and adequate staff at crucial positions. To illustrate, during the relevant period, 
the institution was going through a serious business strategy restructuring which 
required strong managerial support, board oversight and powerful systems and 
controls. However, as a result of its staff rotating scheme (typically 3 years), 
personnel with limited experience, skills and knowledge, and most importantly, 
with inadequate level of understanding of the FSA requirements, were placed at 
senior positions, including the CEO. Unsurprisingly, the developing operations 
proved to be a failure as a result of poor corporate governance and control 
arrangements. Although this incident occurred along the senior positions, it gives 
a strong insight of the importance of staff experience, risk of staff turnover and 
rotational staff schemes in every hierarchical level. 
This analysis supports that scenario analysis and learning culture play an 
important role in risk management, as they target at reducing uncertainties 
regarding employee behaviour under unexpected loss incidents, which is 
achieved through enhancing the level of employee experience under unforeseen 
events. In fact, learning culture can be used as supplementary to scenario 
analysis by using known events in the scenario analysis. This is also why the FSA 
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XVHVµSXEOLFFHQVXUH¶DQGZDUQLQJQRWLFHVDVPHDQVWRUDLVHDZDUHQHVs within the 
financial industry, anticipating that managers will take the appropriate measures 
to eliminate particular events. Interestingly, the analysis indicated that managers 
failed to take such warnings seriously. To exemplify, at the senior level, 10 out of 
WKH  µXQUHFRJQLVHG¶ LQFLGHQWV (Appendix 4) could have been recognised, and 
even avoided, if managers had taken appropriate actions after the FSA warnings 
regarding the specific incident. Moreover, given that these incidents had occurred 
in a period of increased awareness DERXW WKH SDUWLFXODU µLQFLGHQW¶ LW LV
unsurprising that this implication was an additional consideration when imposing 
the financial penalty. To justify, history has shown that rogue trading results 
from a common set of internal control failures, such as lack of monitoring and 
supervision over trading procedures. Nonetheless, the FSAFN revealed that 
institutions fail to take appropriate measures to mitigate such risks (Cases: 6, 
12, 27), while warnings and indications submitted in public by the FSA are 
greatly disregarded (Cases: 3, 5, 8, 9, 13, 16, 18, 31, 32). These cases indicate 
that despite the )6$¶V DWWHPSWV WR HQFRXUDJH WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI OHDUQLQJ
culture, institutions fail to take appropriate considerations. Indeed, with the 
exception of Case 31 and 34, none of types of failures or incidents, is unique 
(Appendix 1).  
In addition to experienced staff, McConnell (2008) states that a well-trained 
workforce, supported by good systems and policies potentially reduces 
operational losses. Indeed, lack of training and/or guidance, and inappropriate 
training were the causes of failure at the incident level in 17 cases in the sample 
(Appendix 3). For example; in Cases 3, 5 and 15, losses were initiated as a result 
of inappropriate training that encouraged sales advisers to follow inappropriate 
techniques; Cases 7 and 25 involved incomplete formal training and competency 
scheme; Cases 8 and 9 inadequate guidance in data handling; Cases 10 and 22 
lack of training and education about bribery and corruption issues; Cases 11, 18 
and 31 lack of training and guidance resulting into lack of process understanding, 
and Cases 20 and 24 lack of product understanding. It is in these cases that 
µDFWLYHVXSSRUW¶E\WKH+5GHSDUWPHQWGLVFXVVHGE\0F&RQQHOOLVFUXFLDO, 
since their responsibility is to mitigate/resolve understaffing and lack of training.  
Further, even though training plays a particular role in mitigating the risk of 
operational losses, the analysis reveals that if training is not supported by 
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monitoring, control and supervision, then institutions are still in danger of 
becoming a victim of people risks. This is revealed by the fact that those 
incidents which had originated as a result of intentional behaviour (Cases: 6, 14, 
19, 21, 22, 27, 30) in reality, they had arisen as a result of, either lack of 
monitoring, or supervision. In these cases, failure in organisational culture is 
implied, VLQFHDILUP¶VFXOWXUHGLFWDWHV whether employees will follow the internal 
rules and procedures when their managers or supervisors are not around, and 
whether new employees will carry out their work in best practice, as they have 
received during their induction and training (Cognisco, 2013). Therefore, in 
VXSSRUW RI 0F&RQQHOO ¶V DUJXPHQW D ZRUNLQJ HQYLURQPHQW ILOOHG ZLWK
experienced workforce and µDSSURDFKDEOH¶ VXSHUYLVRUVDYDLODEOH WRPRQLWRU DQG
JXLGHWKHHPSOR\HHEHKDYLRXUXQGHUµXQXVXDO¶RFFDVLRQV, reduces the probability 
that small losses grow into large losses. This is because with an ongoing 
monitoring and supervision, minor losses are revealed and fixed at an early stage 
thus preventing incubation of failures; as it has happened in 24 out of the 34 
cases in the sample, where failures remained unnoticed. 
Furthermore, escalation of information flow across the hierarchy is particularly 
crucial especially at the operational level. This is because, although everything 
starts from there, central decisions are taken by senior members who are not 
on-site of these operations. This is why it is important for managers to make 
regular inspections and understand in-depth the work at the operational level, in 
order to mitigate the threat of negligence of risks existing at the front-row. For 
instance, Case 17 involves origination of the incident or error from an external 
third party at the front office. If the staff had not passed this information, 
managers would have been left unaware of the incident, thus making decisions 
based on ill-defined grounds. Case 4 also stresses the importance of passing the 
information in a timely manner, as it showed that although employees raised 
concerns on the issues, managers received delayed information, making them 
unable to take effective action on time. Therefore, during unexpected incidents, 
it is important to have proper controls in place to ensure that information travels 
along the hierarchy effectively, and efficiently. However, without strong 
leadership, and clearly defined roles and responsibilities to respond, or take 
action to the escalated information, these controls are useless (see Cases: 17, 
18). Having strong communication procedures along with cooperation integrated 
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both, vertically and horizontally across the hierarchy, while avoiding business 
units operating in silos, play a substantial role in this situation. Of course, correct 
decisions are made only when quality information is submitted in a timely 
manner about everything that is going on from the front-row up to the highest 
OHYHO RI WKH µODGGHU¶ ZKLOH VXFFHVVIXO FRPPXQLFDWLRQ FDQ RQO\ EH DFKLHYHG
through training and education that aim to establish common values and beliefs 
in line with organisational objectives.   
In summary, DWWKHLQFLGHQWOHYHOSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRXUDFWLRQVDQGRUQRQ-actions 
can be divideGLQWRWZRFDWHJRULHVQDPHO\ µUHDFWLRQ¶DWWKHRSHUDWLRQDODQGDW
the managerial level. In brief, the people risks at the operational level are the 
FRQVHTXHQFHV RI SHRSOH¶V EHKDYLRXU DW WKH PDQDJHULDO OHYHO +RZHYHU HYHQ
though people risks play a substantial role in the occurrence of an incident, risk 
of failures are not rooted from people as such. Instead, they result from in-depth 
organisational and cultural failures which come into the surface only after the 
occurrence of an incident.   
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4.3. Individual 
McConnell (2008) FRQVLGHUV WKH µLQWHQWLRQ¶ RI the people involved, both at the 
level of individual or group of individuals, a key aspect in people risk. He 
LGHQWLILHGµXQLQWHQWLRQDO¶DQDFWLRQRUEHKDYLRXUDULVLQJDVDUHVXOWRIVRPHRWKHU
IRUP RI ULVN VXFK DV SURFHVV ULVN ZKLOH µLQWHQWLRQDO¶ EHKDYLRXU LV GHILQHG  E\
WKUHH W\SHV RI LQWHQWLRQDO µPLVEHKDYLRXU¶, often challenging to distinguish 
between them; illegal, unethical and inappropriate. The analysis found evidence 
that McConnell ¶V discussion on people risk is one-sided, as it focuses 
merely on intentional employee behaviour originating from people themselves, 
thus avoiding to take into consideration risks rising from internal failures. In 
contrast, this analysis found that although intentional behaviour is not rare, in 
PRVWFDVHVLWZDVµLQGLUHFWO\¶LQGXFHGRUIDLOHGWREHHOLPLQDWHGby deficiencies 
in internal controls and systems in conjunction with process and systems design 
failures. A crucial finding of this study is that evidence of the existence of a 
correlation between the causes of behaviour, and the intention of the people has 
been found. Specifically, behaviour can be induced or controlled through training, 
incentive schemes, supervision and monitoring. Appendix 5 depicts that 
intentional behaviour is often followed by lack of monitoring and supervision, or 
lack of controls, which encourage exploitation of authority with actions remaining 
uncovered, while unintentional behaviour is associated with lack of training 
(including, lack of education, guidance, knowledge, skills and understanding) and 
misaligned incentive schemes.  
Further, two additional types of behaviour were discovered, µXQLQWHQWLRQDO EXW
LQDSSURSULDWH¶ associated with both, training, and training and monitoring, and 
µXQLQWHQWLRQDOEXW LUUHVSRQVLEOH¶associated with monitoring and lack of controls. 
To justify, Case 8 and 9 involve lack of training and guidance regarding the 
importance of data security which resulted in unethical or inappropriate action. 
Therefore, even though McConnell (2008) supports that intentional behaviour 
consists of three types of intentional behaviour, these cases indicate that these 
types of misbehaviour, can also be associated with unintentional actions, as a 
result of ignorance about the significance or existence of certain rules and 
regulations. Consequently, if the staff are not trained or educated about 
important issues or procedures, then unsurprisingly inappropriate actions arise 
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without the staff being aware that their actions may breach legal or regulatory 
boundaries.  
Although this study generally considers people behaviour that arises from lack of 
training and inappropriate incentive schemes as µXQLQWHQWLRQDO¶since they dictate 
cultural failures, the employee behaviour engaged in Cases 2, 22 and 34 are 
considered to be intentional, as activities were deliberately pursued (Appendix 
5). This study found that although, on the surface, is considered relatively easy 
to blame people (such as, in the rogue trading cases) about negative outcomes, 
after an in depth analysis, judging employee behaviour becomes challenging and 
a controversial issue, subject to subjectivity and variance in perceptions. Cases 
that raised such controversy in this research were often involved with a 
combination of training and monitoring, and incentive schemes and monitoring. 
However, this controversy highlights that managers can mitigate people risk 
through appropriate training and education, in conjunction with, ongoing 
supervision and monitoring upon their actions and performance. It also highlights 
that incentive schemes play a crucial role in aligning organisational and 
employee targets together. However, in order to eliminate intentional behaviour, 
managers need to identify the boundaries of these schemes to avoid 
misbehaviour relative to employee attempts to maximise self-interest. Yet, 
monitoring and action controls are essential. 
Another important aspect of this study is that a successful implementation of a 
µQREODPH¶FXOWXUHLVFRQVLGHUHGWREHDSRZHUIXO incentive scheme in identifying 
and mitigating people risk. This is because it allows information about people-
related failures to be communicated and escalated without employees being 
afraid of blame. For example, Case 14 involves intentional behaviour in relation 
to lack of reporting a data loss incident which had originated by an individual. If 
the individual, or its colleagues, ZHUH QRW DIUDLG RI µEODPH¶ WKLV LQIRUPDWLRQ
would have been passed to the managers, where appropriate measures would 
have been taken, thus avoiding further inefficiencies. Case 34 provides a pure 
justification of a µQREODPH¶FXOWure in that, intentional behaviour originated after 
PDQDJHU¶VDQQRXQFHPHQW WKDW µGLVFLSOLQDU\DFWLRQ¶ZLOOEHWDNHQDJDLQVWVSHFLILF
employee failures, hence inducing employees to alter original documentation to 
avoid the blame. Therefore, in addition to MF&RQQHOO ¶V DUJXPHQW
intentional employee behaviour is not always originated at the individual level, 
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rather, it is often induced through managerial actions or non-actions, implying 
that managers fail to take into consideration the consequences of their actions. 
Moreover, the study revealed HYLGHQFHRIµJURXSWKLQN¶, particularly in relation to 
sales practices. For example, in Case 1 and 2, employees pursued their actions 
µGHOLEHUDWHO\¶ DV D UHVXOW RI µJURXSWKLQN¶ SHUFHSWLRQ at the operational level. 
Additionally, even though McConnell (2008) fails to consider individual actions at 
the managerial level, the research revealed that such intentional behaviour exists 
at the senior level too (Cases: 23, 30). In fact, these cases acquired the highest 
financial penalties in the sample, both of which were involved with intentional 
behaviour conducted by individuals in conjunction with their managers. These 
PDQDJHULDO DFWLRQV FDQ EH FRQVLGHUHG DV µJURXSWKLQN¶ IURP WKH VXERUGLQDWHV¶
perspective, encouraging them to continue pursuing illegal behaviour.  
To sum up, people risk at the lower levels of the hierarchy can be mitigated 
through successful  training, education, guidance and µQR EODPH¶ FXOWXUH
embedded in the organisational culture. Additionally, incentive schemes were 
proved to be one of the key tools in directing people actions towards the goals of 
the institution, where supervision and monitoring are essential supplements in 
setting the borders of these actions. However, evidence was found that largest 
losses result from intentional managerial behaviour, rather than deliberate 
actions at the lower hierarchical levels. Therefore, this is where domestic 
regulation comes into play by imposing behaviour controls at the senior level, 
such as personal fines, or other forms of regulatory restrictions. 
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4.4. Institution 
From the µinstitution¶ perspective, none of the cases in the sample incurred 
immense failures merely as a result of either an individual, or a group of 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶ DFWLRQV at the operational level, whether these were intentional, or 
XQLQWHQWLRQDO,QVWHDGµLQFLGHQWV¶SURYLGHGDIRUPRIDµWULJJHUHYHQW¶LQRUGHUWR
bring to the surface institutional failures, and particularly, risks arising from ill-
defined organisational culture, reckless employee behaviour at the advanced 
level of the hierarchy, or from systems and controls that were incubating in the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQORQJEHIRUHWKHµWULJJHUHYHQW¶had occurred (i.e. loss at the incident 
level). Since the leaders of the organisation, and the promoters of organisational 
culture, are the senior managers, executives and board of directors, their actions 
inevitably have a bigger influence to the behaviour of the organisation than the 
standard employees. Consequently, it is the absence of management support for 
their own norms and policies, usually as a result of greedy behaviour (see Cases: 
23,   WKDW µOHJLWLPLVHV¶ LQGLYLGXDOV LQ µEUHDNLQJ WKH UXOHV¶ 0F&RQQHOO
2008).  
The study revealed limited evidence on greedy behaviour from the managerial 
perspective; on the contrary, managerial negligence was one of the most 
common behaviours found in the cases. At this level, the study considered 
managerial negligence to take action upon warnings or awareness of regulatory 
misalignments (Cases: 3, 5, 12, 13, 14, 16, 28, 31) or failures within the 
organisation (Cases: 6, 8, 9, 20, 25, 27) as the main cause in the relative 
failures (Appendix 6). This is because it is regarded to be a distinctive reckless 
behaviour, which gives rise to, or fails to mitigate, potential risks; hence bringing 
to the surface an ill-defined organisational culture which becomes responsible for 
the dysfunctionality of the institution as a whole. However, in accordance with 
0F&RQQHOO ¶V FRQVLGHUDWLRQ UHDFWLRQ WR WKHVH W\SHV RI IDLOXUHV LV QRt an 
easy task as it often requires holistic organisational change, including changing 
internal systems and controls, and organisational culture. As a solution, 
McConnell (2008) suggests that organisational change can be supported by HR. 
Nonetheless, this study suggests that preventive procedures could be 
implemented, such as, scenario analysis, learning and µno blame¶ culture (see 
Section 4.2, 4.3), to eliminate the need of organisational change where possible.  
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An additional finding of the study is that, people-related failures at the 
institutional level are not always initiated or caused by the behaviours or actions 
of executive members (Appendix 6). This is because, on top of their personal 
actions and behaviours, internal systems and controls play a fundamental role in 
their performance as senior staff act, or behave, in accordance to the outcome of 
these internal systems and controls. In addition, a successful implementation of 
organisational culture along the whole of the institution is another requirement in 
keeping the focus of senior staff in line with the organisational objectives. 
However, corporate governance should always ensure that culture is in line with 
the FSA regulatory requirements to avoid compliance issues, as happened in the 
cases mentioned above. In general, for an organisation to operate in a healthy 
environment, organisational culture and system controls should be set 
successfully as managerial actions will be defined and driven through their 
outcomes, while people behaviour should be controlled through incentive 
schemes.  
Similarly, McConnell (2008) supports that; culture is one of the root causes of 
the problems. Correspondingly, the root cause analysis conducted on the failures 
described in the FSAFN found evidence that 9 incidents resulted from poor 
culture (including, ineffective communication and inefficient information flow). 
For instance, in Case 4 and 18, managers took reactive decisions breaching the 
FSA requirements as a result of mismatching between organisational culture and 
the FSA Principles. Further, he argues that LW LVWKHµVRFLDO LQWHUDFWLRQV¶EHWZHHQ
people that cause problems in dysfunctional institutions LQZKLFKµLQGLYLGXDOVDUH
XVXDOO\ DW IDXOW¶ as a result of unethical behaviour or lack of action and 
responsibility (McConnell, 2008: p.376). In fact, correlation with this argument 
was found in Case 7, where lack of responsibility resulted from poor social 
LQWHUDFWLRQV DPRQJVW EXVLQHVV XQLWV WKDW RSHUDWHG LQ µVLORV¶, and in Case 23, 
where insufficient information flow left the board unaware of the failures.  
Finally, eYHQWKRXJK3HRSOH5LVN)UDPHZRUNDQG0F&RQQHOO ¶VGLVFXVVLRQ
upon it focuses on risks arising merely from the people themselves, and poor 
culture, this study reveals a significant amount of evidence on people risk arising 
as a result of poor internal systems and controls. More unambiguously, the study 
revealed that although culture and µVRFLDOLQWHUDFWLRQV¶GRSOD\DVXEVWDQWLDOUROH
individuals are not always at fault, in that behaviour or actions are significantly 
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induced by poor systems and controls ZKLFK JLYH WKH LOOXVLRQ WKDW µHYHU\WKLQJ
ZRUNVILQH¶XQWLODQXQH[SHFWHGHYHQWRFFXUV, revealing their deficiencies. Indeed, 
as indicated in Appendix 6, systems and controls contributed to the µURRW¶RIWKH
causes in 25 cases, corporate governance (i.e. people-related failures) in 19 
cases, and organisational culture (including, ineffective communication and 
inefficient information flow) in 9 cases. Yet, it is important to note that even 
though all the cases are related to inefficient and inappropriate controls and 
culture implementation, these results are based on the main cause that 
originated people-related failures at the institutional level. 
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4.5. Industry 
According to McConnell (2008), large operational losses can occur across the 
whole financial sector as a result of people¶V actions in various institutions, 
distinctively. As McConnell (2008) mentions, existing empirical literature 
revealed that, WKH ODUJHVW ORVVHV WHQG WR EH µILQHV OHYLHG RQ ILUPV¶ IRU DFWLRQV
against clients and against employees, while the underlying causes of these 
losses are the employee actions within the organisation that µcaused the fines to 
be levied, i.e. people risk¶ (McConnell, 2008: p. 377). In addition to the fines 
imposed on the firms as a result of people behaviour, he argues that on the 
industrial level, herding behaviour and µDFURVV-the-board failure of ethical 
VWDQGDUGV LQ WKH LQGXVWU\¶ provide additional people-related failures within the 
whole industry. This argument relates to the evidence found in this current 
study. More explicitly, evidence shows that the FSA considers the size of the 
institution to be a significant factor when the fine is imposed. This is because 
institutions with leading position in the industry, such as nearly every institution 
consisting in the sample of the current study, reasonably, have the potential to 
promote herding behaviour in the industry. More explicitly, in their attempt to 
remain competitive in the market, smaller financial institutions pursue the 
actions and behaviour of the LQGXVWU\ µOHDGHUV¶. Therefore, leading institutions 
should set an example for the smaller institutions by pursuing appropriate and 
legal policies and procedures, in accordance with the rules and regulations of the 
FSA.  
The study revealed that the extent of the impact of people risk which arises from 
WKHµLQFLGHQW¶OHYHO, indeed, disembarks on the industrial level. In addition to the 
risk of herding, the analysis identified various other types of potential risks that 
impact the industry. Given the size of the institutions, the FSA claims that 
through their reckless actions, institutions had exposed the FSA at the risk of 
losing its integrity, and its ability to reduce financial crime, maintain market 
confidence, and protect customers. Maintaining market confidence is crucial in 
order for the financial services sector to remain in the market, however, in many 
of the cases, the industry became a victim of the distinctive institutional losses 
by losing market confidence. In this case, it can be said that people risk arising 
internally in one institution, becomes external people risk for another/others. In 
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addition to this, the operational losses described in the cases indicated that they 
impact substantially the regulation itself in that, in various occasions, it induced 
the FSA to undertake stricter measures in order to avoid further losses. Although 
this may be valuable from the regulatory perspective in terms of increasing even 
further financial security in the market, from the organisational perspective, it is 
considered a challenge, as institutions have to deal with tighter measures 
restricting their actions. Therefore, once more, it can be concluded that other 
independent institutions in the market, become YLFWLPVRI µDFWLYH¶SHRSOHULVNRI
their competitors, hence indicating the difficulty involved in identifying and 
measuring the scope of risks associated with people behaviour and actions.  
Finally, it is important to mention that, not all the cases enclosed evidence 
correlating with people risk at the industrial level (Appendix 7). However, the 
most serious cases in relation to risks directly impacting the financial industry, 
both domestically and internationally, were Cases 26 and 30; both of which were 
involved with misconduct relating to the calculation of LIBOR and EURIBOR. 
Since the impact of the operational losses involved in these two cases had the 
SRWHQWLDO WRKDYHD WUHPHQGRXV µFROOLVLRQ¶ LQ WKH LQGXVWU\ LW LVQR VXUSULVH WKDW
they acquire the two highest fines in the sample. Therefore, this stage of the 
analysis exposed the importance of the people operating within the financial 
industry to understand that, the extent of their behavioural impact extends 
beyond the institution in which they operate, and that it can potentially cause 
serious financial losses in the whole of the industry. Undeniably, this can only be 
achieved through the organisational culture, and through the FSA requirements.  
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4.6. Evaluation of the Framework 
Considering the People Risk Framework as a whole, it can be said that, although 
not every single case enclosed information enabling correlation with all the cases 
consistently, overall, the FSAFNs do provide correlating evidence in the existence 
of people risk within the four dimensions distinctively. Hence, it can be concluded 
that real life evidence does exist, ensuring the validity of the theoretical 
framework in practice. However, the analysis revealed some critical 
complications suggesting a review of the framework in specific aspects. First and 
foremost, the explanation of the framework was found to be brief and basic, thus 
facing difficulties in relating the evidence with the theory consistently. This 
outcome was also induced due to the anticipated imperfect matching between 
theory and evidence. In addition, distinguishing people risk in the FSAFN was 
challenging not only because the descriptive analysis of the fines was mostly 
referring to institutions themselves, rather than individuals¶ DFWLYLWLHV, but also 
because employee actions are interrelated indicating the difficulty in separating 
such evidence under each dimension. This is because the evidence indicating 
people-UHODWHGIDLOXUHLQHDFKGLPHQVLRQGRHVQRWRFFXULQDµVLOR¶PDQQHUVXFK
as the framework implies. Rather, these failures are systemic in that, one action 
rises after the other, resulting into an µinseparable¶ chain of µEHKDYLRXUDO¶events 
within all of the dimensions. Therefore, even though people risk exists within all 
the four dimensions, they cannot be treated separately. Hence, when 
organisations are considering mitigation strategies in relation to people risk, they 
should regard them as an integral operation.  
Further, McConnell (2008) considers people risk, risks that arise from people 
themselves. Although this is thH µSXUH¶ PHDQLQJ RI SHRSOH ULVN the study 
revealed that, in most of the cases, people-related failures arise as a result of 
poor internal systems and controls, rather than from behaviour at an individual 
level. However, it should be noted that this implication was extracted based on 
the limited information acquired from the FSAFN concerning individual behaviour. 
Although these failures may be regarded as process and system risk, this study 
suggests that it may be regarded as an additional dimension within the 
IUDPHZRUN DQG SDUWLFXODUO\ XQGHU µLQVWLWXWLRQ¶ LQ ZKLFK SHRSOH ULVN SRWHQWLDOO\
rises. Similarly, even though the cases provided limited reference to the failures 
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occurring within the µ7KUHH OLQHV RI GHIHQFH¶ PRGHO WKH DQDO\VLV RI WKH FDses 
indicated that it would be useful to integrate this approach within the framework 
in order to gain further insights of people risks. Additionally, another possible 
consideration is to include hierarchy levels in addition to the four dimensions in 
the framework, since intentional behaviour was recognised not only at the low 
level of the hierarchy, but rather across several levels. Considering these 
arguments, it may be suggested that the framework provides fundamental 
grounds in identifying potential areas of people risk; however there is room for 
improvements.  
Moreover, throughout the study it was revealed that the framework provides a 
powerful tool when it comes to learning lessons and additional insights regarding 
the analysis of operational losses. This is because it can be used by practitioners 
as a guiding mechanism as to identify the scope of people risk. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the People Risk Framework has the potential to become an 
even stronger mechanism in the emerging literature of people risk, by 
suggesting that a more detailed and extended version of the framework would be 
more useful for its practitioners. 
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5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The aim of the paper was to investigate the validity of the People Risk 
Framework, proposed by McConnell (2008) with the purpose of identifying the 
diverse boundaries of people risk. In particular, this study has examined the 
extent to which this theoretical framework is applicable in real-life by attempting 
to find a correlation between the theoretical dimensions comprising the 
framework, namely, incident, individual, institution and industry; and factual 
evidence, using operational loss events. Hence, evidence was sought within the 
FSAFN imposed to large banks and insurers operating within the UK for the last 
five years. By undertaking a content analysis of the sample cases, this study has 
shown that, correlating evidence does exists in the FSAFN, hence concluding that 
the framework is applicable in practise. However, the study supports that the 
framework is generic, providing the basic grounds for capturing people risk. The 
evidence from this study suggests that there are additional aspects to be 
considered when identifying the scope of people risk. In particular, it was 
identified that the main causes of the rise of people risk in the FSAFN were the 
result of poor internal systems and controls, especially relative to training and 
monitoring, and incentive schemes, giving rise to system and process risk 
through which people risk was then generated. This finding contradicts with the 
existing theory suggesting that people risk rises as a result of intentional 
employee behaviour. In fact, this type of behaviour was hardly recognised in the 
evidence.  
Additionally, although a limited number of cases wHUH UHIHUULQJ WR WKH µ7KUHH
OLQHVRIGHIHQFH¶PRGHOWKHVWXG\VXJJHVWVWKDWFRQVLGHULQJWKLVDSSURDFKZKHQ
dealing with people risk management may provide further useful insights. The 
study also suggests a possible restructuring of the framework considering people 
risk along the hierarchical levels, as it was revealed that risky behaviour does not 
only occur at the low level of the hierarchy as the framework suggests. In fact, 
the study showed that intentional behaviour at the institutional level imposes 
more severe impacts. 
Moreover, it was indicated that not all the losses arise as a result of unexpected 
loss events. Even when considering external factors such as the GFC as an 
µXQH[SHFWHG¶ LQFLGHQW LW ZDV LQGLFDWHG WKDW ORVVHV UHVXOWHG IURP IDLOXUHV well 
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EHIRUHWKHµXQH[SHFWHG¶HYHQWKHQFHGHPRQVWUDWLQJUHDOHYLGHQFHRQWKHQHHG
of proactive risk management, supported by Martin (2009), Ashby (2009) and, 
Blunden and Thirlwell (2010). McConnell (2008) suggests that it is important for 
operational risk managers to cooperate with the HR department in order to 
control and eliminate risky behaviour, through training and education, and 
maintain a satisfactory working environment. Yet, even when employees are 
well-trained, employee behaviour during the potenWLDO µXQH[SHFWHG¶ HYHQW
remains unforeseen. Despite its exploratory nature, this study offers some 
insight into possible learning outcomes through the investigation of the FSAFN. 
Particularly, one of the outcomes of this study is that, in addition to the scenario 
analysis and learning culture, a powerful people risk mitigating technique, is the 
successful implementation of a µQR EODPH¶ FXOWXUH 7KLV WHFKQLTXH QRW RQO\
enables managers to gain even more insights concerning the potential areas that 
people risks may arise, but also it allows escalation of information concerning 
people-related failures without employees being afraid of losing their job. 
,PSRUWDQWO\ LWDOVRDOORZVUHSRUWLQJRI LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWVPDOOIDLOXUHVRU µQHDU
PLVVHV¶FDXVHGE\HPSOR\HHV that may otherwise cause serious consequences 
in the organisations through decision-making based on unreliable information.  
Given thDWWRWKHDXWKRU¶VNQRZOHGJHWKH3HRSOH5LVN)ramework is roughly the 
only existing literature that aims to capture the broadness of the scope of people 
risk, the current study contributes to existing knowledge by providing assurance 
on the effectiveness of this framework, allowing further studies to be built upon 
these grounds. Additionally, the current paper adds substantially to the level of 
understanding the framework, and people risk itself. It also provides a useful 
example for future practitioners, as to what type of evidence can be used with 
this framework, and how to approach it, while it provides considerations for 
additional developments in areas which people risks may occur. It also 
introduces to the research field an innovative and rich dataset (i.e. the FSAFN) 
which can provide crucial insights into operational risk failures. 
Furthermore, although the study has reached its objectives, there are some 
unavoidable limitations which should be considered. Firstly, the understanding 
and interpretation of the underlying framework itself is based on subjectivity, 
DQG GHSHQGV RQ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ perception. Since the author of the proposed 
framework (P. McConnell) has provided limited description and explanation of the 
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framework, it increases the level of variances in perception. Secondly, the study 
acknowledges that to generate valid results, consistency is required. However, 
maintaining consistency throughout the data collection and analysis of each case 
was challenging due to the nature of the database. Particularly, although overall 
the cases were consistent, slight differences still exist over the years, such as the 
changing regulatory environment. Notably, the fact that the study was conducted 
by a single researcher reduces the level of its validity. Thirdly, findings are 
subject to the limited availability of the relevant information enclosed in the 
documented data, its accuracy, and its biasness. Last but not least, the findings 
are limited to the small size of the sample and the short period of interest. They 
also represent only a small proportion of the financial services sector, as the data 
includes only banks and insurers operating in the UK. Therefore, caution must be 
applied when drawing conclusions, as the findings may not be valid in more 
generic terms. 
Moreover, this current study reveals that a number of possible future studies 
using the same experimental concept are apparent. To begin with, it is 
recommended to repeat the same experimental dataset undertaken by more 
than one researcher and for a longer period of time to acquire more valid results. 
Additionally, it would be interesting to examine the effect of people risk before 
and after the financial crisis, and/or the differences between the FSA and FCA, 
using the underlying framework to reveal whether regulatory changes have an 
effective impact on the people risk mitigation. Interestingly, the study has 
revealed that the particular experimental concept provides potentially valuable 
learning outcomes concerning people risk identification and mitigation 
WHFKQLTXHV )XUWKHU VLQFH WKH LPSDFW RI ILQDQFLDO UHJXODWLRQ µGLVHPEDUNV¶ LQ
international markets, it would be interesting to conduct a cross-national 
comparative study using evidence of all the domestic regulatory fines in order to 
allow the findings to be relevant at the international level. In relation to this, it 
would also be interesting to undertake the same study in order to investigate the 
impact of Basel III and Solvency II on people risk to identify possible regulatory 
improvements.  
Finally, one of the most significant implications of this study is the recognition of 
the importance of people working within such large financial institutions, to be 
aware, and understand, the extent to which the impact of their actions, or 
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behaviour, may have. Recognising the fact that any type of misbehaviour may 
have a substantial impact, beyond the institution in which they function, may 
potentially encourage a more responsible behaviour in the employee routine 
operations. Therefore, an important starting point in encouraging this type of 
behaviour would be for the FSA, or the current FCA, to emphasise personal 
behaviour and actions within the final notices, rather than merely attributing the 
failures to the organisation in general. This is suggested in order to stress the 
importance of the consequences of the employee actions. Of course, this cannot 
be achieved without the help of embedding this attribute in the organisational 
culture, which can be further reimbursed by adding such a requirement in the 
regulatory framework. In addition to the disclosure of specific employee actions, 
the FSA could impose stricter measures towards managerial behaviour, such as 
personal fines or restrictions, in order to indicate the importance of their roles 
and responsibilities and also to limit intentional behaviour at the senior level. 
Further, since the senior level performance depends on the outcomes of internal 
systems and controls, and with the FSA being responsible to control this 
performance; the FSA could impose regular assessments on these controls to 
ensure that seniors perform EDVHGRQµKHDOWK\¶JURXQGV. 
In conclusion, although there is a lack of literature in people risk, nevertheless, it 
does not cease to elevate its value; and the applicability of using the People Risk 
Framework in real life is further reinforced by this research, acting as a stepping 
stone to the emerging literature. 
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7. Appendices 
Appendix 1: Brief Description of the Final Notices in the sample 
Year Case Institution Name Brief Description Principles 
Breached 
Penalty 
2008 1 Eggs Banking Plc Unfair Customer Treatment: non-advised 
telephone sales of credit card payment 
protection insurance (PPI) 
3, 6 £1,030,000 
2008 2 Credit Suisse 
International and 
Credit Suisse 
Securities (EU) Ltd 
Mispricing of Asset-backed securities by a 
small number of traders 
3, 2 £5,600,000 
2008 3 Liverpool Victoria 
Banking Services 
Limited 
Unfair Customer Treatment: sales of 
payment protection insurance (PPI) 
offered in connection with unsecured 
personal loans 
3, 6, 7 £1,200,000 
2008 4 Hastings Insurance 
Services Limited 
Asset mispricing resulting to unfair 
customer treatment 
6 £1,050,000 
2008 5 HFC Bank Limited Unfair Customer Treatment (PPI): 
unsuitable customer advice  
3, 9 £1,085,000 
2009 6 Toronto Dominion 
Bank (London 
Branch) 
Rogue Trading: loss of CAD$96m into 
WUDGHU¶V book revealed after his 
redundancy. Failings in the systems and 
controls concerning trading book pricing 
and marking within the Credit Products 
*URXS³&3*´EXVLQHVV 
3, 2 £10,000,000 
2009 7 UBS AG Money-Laundering-Rogue Trading: 
employees on the international wealth 
management business desk involved in 
unauthorised foreign exchange and 
precious metals trading across 39 
customer accounts 
3, 2 £8,000,000 
2009 8 HSBC Insurance 
Brokers Ltd 
Data Security 3 £1,000,000 
2009 9 HSBC Life UK Data Security 3 £1,610,000 
2009 10 Aon Ltd Suspicious payments to Overseas 3rd 
Parties of approx. US$2.5M DQG¼M 
3 £5,250,000 
2010 11 DB UK Bank Unfair Customer Treatment 3, 6 £1,200,000 
2010 12 Goldman Sachs 
International 
Rogue Trading: serious violations of US 
securities law 
2, 3, 11 £17,500,000 
2010 13 Société Générale Inaccurate, Incomplete transaction 
reporting 
Sup17 £1,575,000 
2010 14 Zurich Insurance 
Plc, UK branch 
Data Security in outsourcing arrangements 
between Zurich UK and Zurich Insurance 
Company South Africa Ltd exposing 
customers to the risk of financial loss, 
burglary and identity theft 
3, SYSC 
3.1.1R, 
SYSC 
3.2.6R 
£2,275,000 
2010 15 The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc, 
National 
Westminster Bank 
Plc, Ulster Bank Ltd, 
Coutts & Company 
Money Laundering 20 (1) £8,000,000 
2010 16 Credit Suisse Inaccurate and Incomplete transaction 
reporting 
Sup17 £1,750,000 
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2010 17 Standard Life 
Assurance Ltd 
Unfair Customer Treatment 3, 7 £2,450,000 
2011 18 Combined 
Insurance Company 
of America 
Unfair Customer Treatment 3, 6 £2,800,000 
2011 19 HSBC Bank Plc, 
NHFA Ltd 
(subsidiary) 
Unfair Customer Treatment 9 £10,500,000 
2011 20 Coutts & Company Unfair Customer Treatment 9 £6,300,000 
2011 21 Credit Suisse Unfair Customer Treatment 3 £5,950,000 
2011 22 Willis Ltd Risk of Bribery and Corruption 3, SYSC 
3.2.6R 
£6,895,000 
2011 23 Bank of Scotland 
Plc 
Aggressive Growth Strategy, with a 
specific focus on high-risk, sub-investment 
grade lending 
3 £3,500,000 
2011 24 Barclays Bank Plc Unfair Customer Treatment: customers 
inappropriately advised 
9 £7,700,000 
2011 25 Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc 
Unfair Customer Treatment 3, 6 £2,800,000 
2012 26 UBS AG LIBOR and EURIBOR abuse, undermining 
the integrity of those benchmark 
references 
3, 5 £160,000,000 
2012 27 UBS AG Rogue Trader 3, 2 £29,700,000 
2012 28 Card Protection Plan 
Ltd 
Unfair Customer Treatment: Mis- selling 
products for over 6-years 
3, 6 , 7 £10,500,000 
2012 29 Bank of Scotland 
plc 
Mortgage Systems relied upon incorrect 
records for 8 years resulting into its 
customers not receiving important 
information thus making insufficiently 
informed decisions about their mortgage 
accounts 
3 £4,200,000 
2012 30 Barclays Bank Plc LIBOR and EURIBOR abuse: Misconduct 
relative to submission rates relative to 
LIBOR EURIBOR setting process for 5 yrs 
3, 2, 5 £59,500,000 
2012 31 Mitsui Sumitomo 
Insurance Company 
(Europe) Ltd 
(MSIEu) 
Corporate governance and control 
arrangements failures resulting in poor 
organisation and management across the 
whole  business, following a decision to 
expand and diversify into a new business 
area 
3 £3,345,000 
2012 32 Coutts & Company Money Laundering 3, SYSC £8,750,000 
2012 33 SANTANDER UK Risk of Mis-selling products 2, 7,  Rule 
6.1.16 
£1,500,000 
2012 34 UK Insurance Ltd Employee submit altered documentation 
 
2 £2,170,000 
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Appendix 2: Description of the Principles Breached 
Principle FSA Handbook Description 
2 Skill, care and diligence A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and 
diligence. 
3 Management and Control A firm must take reasonable care to organise and control its 
affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk 
management systems. 
5 Market Conduct A firm must observe proper standards of market conduct.  
6 Customer's Interests A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers 
and treat them fairly. 
7 Communications with clients A firm must pay due regard to the information needs of its 
clients, and communicate information to them in a way 
which is clear, fair and not misleading. 
9 Customers: relationships of trust A firm must take reasonable care to ensure the suitability of 
its advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who 
is entitled to rely upon its judgment. 
11 Relations with Regulators A firm must deal with its regulators in an open and 
cooperative way, and must disclose to the FSA appropriately 
anything relating to the firm of which the FSA would 
reasonably expect notice. 
Chapter17 
(SUP17) 
Transaction Reporting  
SYSC 3.1.1R Senior Management 
Arrangements, Systems and 
Controls sourcebook 
A firm must take reasonable care to establish and maintain 
such systems and controls as are appropriate to its 
business. 
SYSC 3.2.6R Senior Management 
Arrangements, Systems and 
Controls sourcebook 
A firm must take reasonable care to establish and maintain 
effective systems and controls for compliance with 
applicable requirements and standards under the regulatory 
system and for countering the risk that the firm might be 
used to further financial crime. 
20 (1)  A relevant person must establish and maintain appropriate 
and risk-sensitive policies and procedures relating to: (a) 
customer due diligence measures and ongoing monitoring; 
(d) internal control; (f) the monitoring and management of 
compliance with, and the internal communication of, such 
policies and procedures in order to prevent activities related 
to money laundering and terrorist financing. 
Rule 6.1.16  (1) A firm carrying on MiFID business must make available 
to a client, who has used or intends to use those services, 
information necessary for the identification of the 
compensation scheme or any other investor-compensation 
scheme of which the firm is a 22 
member (including, if relevant, membership through a 
branch) or any alternative arrangement provided for in 
accordance with the Investor Compensation Directive. 
(2) The information under (1) must include the amount and 
scope of the cover offered by the compensation scheme and 
any rules laid down by the EEA State pursuant to article 2 
(3) of the Investor Compensation Directive. 
(3) A firm must provide, on the client's request, information 
concerning the conditions governing compensation and the 
formalities which must be completed to obtain 
compensation. 
(4) The information provided for in this rule must be made 
available in a durable medium or via a website if the website 
conditions are satisfied in the official language or languages 
of the EEA State. 
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Appendix 3: Analysis of the Data- Evidence on the four Dimensions 
Case Brief Description Incident Individual Institution (Principles breached) Industry Causes 
1 Unfair Customer 
Treatment: non-
advised telephone 
sales of credit card 
payment 
protection 
insurance (PPI) 
Failure in system process, 
process risk 
Unintentional, systems-
think, lack of proper training 
(3, 6) - Serious or systemic weakness 
of the management systems or 
internal controls 
 Training 
2 Mis-prising of 
Asset-backed 
securities by a 
small number of 
traders 
Remuneration incentives 
failure 
Intentional misconduct, 
groupthink. Certain traders 
were able to circumvent 
controls by exploiting their 
technical knowledge and 
their expertise relative to 
certain control personnel. 
The pricing of the securities 
have a direct effect on the 
calculation of their personal 
remuneration 
(3, 2) - Inefficient preventive and 
detective controls, absence of close 
supervision, failure in translating 
important information into actions, 
failures in design, implementation, 
operation and management of 
controls. Complex structures with 
multiple reporting lines led to 
uncertainty as to supervisory 
responsibilities. Too much reliance on 
inexperience and/or junior personnel. 
Insufficient senior level oversight was 
committed to supervising and 
supporting day-to-day processes 
In its Investment 
Banking division, Credit 
Suisse has 
approximately 20,600 
employees operating in 
57 locations across 26 
countries 
Remuneration  
schemes 
3 Unfair Customer 
Treatment: sales 
of payment 
protection 
insurance (PPI) 
offered in 
connection with 
unsecured 
personal loans 
Sales Process Design 
Failure: sales process 
IROORZHGµDVVXPSWLYH¶
selling technique, in which 
PPI was automatically 
included when customers 
asked for quotations for 
personal loans 
Unintentional, Sales 
Advisers: trained to follow 
assumptive technique, 
bonus schemes attached to 
the PPI sales rather than 
sale of loan. Sales 
SupeUYLVRUV¶FRPPLVVLRQ
was based on PPI creating a 
conflict of interest with the 
supervision of sales staff 
(3, 6, 7) - Failure of the board of 
directors to redesign the sales process 
even after the notice from the FSA to 
ensure that the PPI process complies 
with the FSA requirements 
FSA will now seek to 
impose higher fines for 
firms in the PPI market 
where standards fall 
below required levels. 
Training 
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4 Asset mispricing 
resulting to unfair 
customer 
treatment 
System Errors which 
resulted in providing 
inaccurate insurance 
quotations and make 
unfair decisions for 
customers 
Unintentional (6) - Slow information flow along the 
hierarchy, Senior Management 
decision making indicated that the 
organisation had an ill-defined  
corporate culture in that its core 
values was not the fair treatment of 
the customer. Senior Management 
failed to inform FSA prior to its 
decision making. Hastings' 
consideration of the costs of rectifying 
its errors was reactive rather than 
proactive. 
Senior management at 
firms had failed to take 
sufficiently seriously 
the need to address 
TCF risks in their 
business. Actions could 
potentially affect the 
confidence in the 
financial system and 
the protection of the 
customers. Its decision 
to cancel the policies 
means that customers 
will have in their 
records that they have 
an insurance cancelled 
despite the cancellation 
being through the 
insurer. 
System Error, 
Slow  
information flow 
5 Unfair Customer 
Treatment (PPI): 
unsuitable advice 
was given to the 
customers 
Process Failure: 
Assumptive technique was 
followed. Staff not trained 
in gathering sufficient 
information about the 
customers prior to 
advising them. Failures 
resulted into unacceptable 
risk of unsuitable sales 
and a failure to treat 
customers fairly. 
Unintentional - lack of 
proper training, monitoring, 
incentive schemes wrongly 
implemented 
(3, 9) - Inadequate and ineffective 
training, compliance monitoring 
procedures, manager oversight and 
record keeping.  Information flow 
along the hierarchy failures. Senior 
managers failed to ensure their PPI 
sales processes were meeting FSA 
requirements despite FSA's 
notifications. Management 
Information. 
- Training, 
Incentive Schemes 
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6 Rogue Trading: 
loss of CAD$96m 
loss into the 
WUDGHU¶VERRN
which was 
revealed after his 
redundancy. 
Failings in the 
systems and 
controls 
concerning trading 
book pricing and 
marking within the 
Credit Products 
Group (CPG) 
business 
Unexpected staff turnover, 
which resulted into lack of 
product knowledge and 
inexperienced back-office 
staff as a result of training 
Unethical illegal behaviour 
of a Trader trying to hide 
significant losses in his 
trading book 
(2, 3) - Failures in trader supervision 
and internal audit process, lack of 
formal review, unclear segregation of 
roles and responsibilities, 
inappropriate management reporting 
and disclosure issues, inadequate 
product knowledge or experience of 
back office staff. Inefficient use of 
existing systems and controls over 
what was a complex business dealing 
in sophisticated and often illiquid 
financial products to detect and 
prevent illegal actions. Failed in using 
existing systems and controls. 
Information flow failures as a result of 
poor communication which could have 
led to earlier detection of the pricing 
issues. Result: failed to price certain 
positions held by the Trader accurately 
and failed to prevent or detect these 
pricing issues in a timely manner. 
Corporate governance failure since 
this was not the first time that a 
trader caused losses as a result of 
mispricing issues. 
Risk that market 
confidence would be 
damaged by the 
sudden and unexpected 
write-down and 
revaluation of securities 
Training, Supervision,  
Lack of controls 
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7 Money-Laundering 
and Rogue 
Trading: certain 
employees on one 
desk in the 
international 
wealth 
management 
business had been 
involved in 
unauthorised 
foreign exchange 
and precious 
metals trading 
across 39 
customer accounts 
µ7UDLQLQJDQG&RPSHWHQF\¶
scheme was incomplete, 
and failed to cover all the 
required business areas; 
no formal, documented 
Training and Competency 
scheme for the Back 
Office 
Rogue Trading - Intentional 
Illegal behaviour, the desk 
had significant autonomy 
and authority 
(3, 2) - Inadequately managed and 
controlled key risks, inappropriate 
supervision, insufficient management 
information to assess the 
effectiveness of risk mitigation 
controls, inadequate management 
business systems and controls, much 
autonomy and authority was given to 
the Desk Heads, lack of preventative 
controls, ineffective reaction to the 
failures, business model based on 
honesty and supervisory obligations 
but not on incompetent and dishonest 
actions, lack of clear leadership roles 
and responsibilities at the front office, 
back-office was operating in silo, 
retained email facility offered to 
clients disabled errors or fraud 
detection. Absent defined and 
documented set of procedures-culture 
management information focused 
more on financial performance rather 
than risk management, compliance or 
training and competence staff, 
compliance and internal audit issues, 
due regard to wandering signs which 
could induce senior management to 
consider whether systems and 
controls are appropriate 
- Training 
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8 Data Security Risk of Data Loss - staff 
sent unencrypted 
customer data to third 
parties, staff left data 
unprotected in the firm's 
offices even though 
access to the firm's offices 
was securely restricted, 
on one occasion, staff did 
not adequately check if 
they had received 
customer data which 
appeared to have been 
sent to the firm by a third 
party. 
Unintentional behaviour but 
inappropriate as a result of 
inadequate guidance on 
how staff should handle or 
transfer customer data 
securely out of the firm, 
encryption of customer data 
sent externally was not 
mentioned in the guidelines 
booklet 
(3) - Lack of relevant processes, 
procedures and training, lack of 
maintenance and establishment of 
effective systems and controls to 
manage the risks relating to data 
security, internal fraud or theft, 
specifically the risk that customer 
information might be lost or stolen. 
Inadequate assessment of the risks 
relating to data security, inadequate 
controls to manage such risks, 
inadequate and ineffective 
procedures, guidance, training and 
monitoring to address these risks, 
corporate governance failed to take 
the appropriate measures in relation 
to data security even after the FSA's 
DGYLFHILUP¶VZULWWHQ procedures 
were fragmented and not readily 
accessible to staff and failed to give 
adequate guidance on how staff 
should handle or transfer customer 
data securely. Whilst staff members 
were expected to report data loss to 
their line manager, there was no 
defined response plan in place for 
reporting such incidents 
The FSA considers the 
fact that the control 
failures resulted in the 
loss of customer data 
is an aggravating 
feature of this case, 
but this is not the sole 
reason for imposing a 
penalty. The defects in 
the procedures alone 
are a cause of 
significant concern and 
routinely exposed 
customers to the risk 
of financial crime. 
Inadequate 
guidance 
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9 Data Security Risk of Data Loss - staff 
sent unencrypted 
customer data to third 
parties, staff left data 
unprotected in the firm's 
offices even though 
access to the firm's offices 
was securely restricted, 
on one occasion, staff did 
not adequately check if 
they had received 
customer data which 
appeared to have been 
sent to the firm by a third 
party. 
Unintentional behaviour but 
inappropriate, as a result of 
inadequate guidance on 
how staff should handle or 
transfer customer data 
securely out of the firm, 
encryption of customer data 
sent externally was not 
mentioned in the guidelines 
booklet 
(3) - Lack of relevant processes, 
procedures and training, lack of 
maintenance and establishment of 
effective systems and controls to 
manage the risks relating to data 
security, internal fraud or theft, 
specifically the risk that customer 
information might be lost or stolen, 
inadequate assessment of the risks 
relating to data security, inadequate 
controls to manage such risks, 
inadequate and ineffective 
procedures, guidance, training and 
monitoring to address these risks, 
corporate governance failed to take 
the appropriate measures in relation 
to data security even after the FSA's 
DGYLFHILUP¶VZULWWHQSURFHGXUHV
were fragmented and not readily 
accessible to staff and failed to give 
adequate guidance on how staff 
should handle or transfer customer 
data securely. Whilst staff members 
were expected to report data loss to 
their line manager, there was no 
defined response plan in place for 
reporting such incidents 
The FSA considers the 
fact that the control 
failures resulted in the 
loss of customer data 
is an aggravating 
feature of this case, 
but this is not the sole 
reason for imposing a 
penalty. The defects in 
the procedures alone 
are a cause of 
significant concern and 
routinely exposed 
customers to the risk 
of financial crime. 
Inadequate 
guidance 
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10 Suspicious 
payments to a 
number of 
Overseas Third 
Parties amounting 
to approximately 
US$2.5 million and 
¼PLOOLRQGXULQJ
the Relevant 
Period. 
Authorisation Process 
failure: Risk of bribery 
and corruption with 
making payments to non-
FSA authorised overseas 
Unintentional but 
inappropriate action: staff 
involved in the making of 
potentially inappropriate 
payments, lack of training 
and education 
(3) - Failure to assess the risks in its 
overseas transactions, ineffective 
controls to mitigate risk, fail to review 
and monitor relationship with 
overseas parties in respect of specific 
bribery risks, lack of training and 
education on bribery risks, lack of 
routinely assessing whether bribery 
and corruption risks were being 
managed effectively, weak control 
environment, inadequate systems 
and procedures in place to prevent 
the matters from occurring or to 
discover them when they did occur, 
defective procedures for the 
authorisation of payments, 
inadequate checks carried out by 
those signing the authorisation forms, 
the authorisation process was 
deficient as it require inadequate 
levels of due diligence to be carried 
out before a relationship with an 
overseas party could be approved, 
failures in risk monitoring and 
management information, systems 
and controls failings existed in a 
number of major business units and 
for a period of nearly three years 
Involvement of UK 
financial institutions in 
(potentially) corrupt 
practices undermines 
the integrity of the UK 
financial services 
sector. Unless they 
have in place robust 
systems and controls 
which govern the 
circumstances in which 
payments may be 
made to third parties, 
UK financial services 
firms risk contravening 
UK and/or overseas 
anti-bribery laws. The 
)6$¶VILQDQFLDOFULPH
and market confidence 
statutory objectives are 
both endangered by UK 
ILUPV¶IDLOXres in this 
regard. Aon Ltd is one 
of the largest insurance 
and reinsurance 
brokerage and risk 
management firms in 
the UK and it has a 
leading competitive 
position in the market 
DQGWKHILUP¶VSUDFWLFHV
set an example which 
is seen by other 
market practitioners 
and customers 
Training 
11 Unfair Customer 
Treatment 
Process Failure: 
Underwriting staff had not 
treated all customers 
fairly when considering 
their applications for 
mortgages and some of 
them were put in risk of 
financial loss inconsistent 
approach applied on 
charging fees to 
borrowers 
Unintentional: mortgage 
servicing staff had 
inadequate understanding 
of TCF and its 
implementation 
(3, 6) - Lack of supervision and 
oversight, lack of compliance checks, 
inadequate systems and controls to 
control and organise the process 
effectively, lending policy was 
insufficient and irresponsible which 
created significant risk of customers 
being treated unfairly, 
- Training 
Lack of product 
knowledge 
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12 Rogue Trading: 
serious violations 
of US securities 
law 
Illegal Transaction: GSC 
and Mr Tourree 
committed serious 
violations of US securities 
law by making misleading 
statements and omissions 
in connection with the 
Abacus transaction 
Intentional illegal action (2, 3, 11) - Failure to comply its UK 
regulatory reporting obligations to 
the FSA, inadequate policies, 
procedures, systems and controls in 
relation to internal communications 
between UK and US operations of the 
GS Group, senior managers were 
aware of certain aspects of the 
incident but none of them informed 
FSA 
Goldman Sachs is a 
highly sophisticated 
firm and among the 
ZRUOG¶VSUHPLHU
financial institutions. 
The firm itself and its 
legal and compliance 
functions are 
integrated on a global 
basis and the senior 
management of those 
functions are (or ought 
to be) in constant 
communication with 
each other regarding 
legal and regulatory 
matters across the 
multiple jurisdictions in 
which Goldman Sachs 
operates its global 
business. 
Communication 
13 Inaccurate and 
Incomplete 
transaction 
reporting 
Reporting Transaction 
Process: failing to submit 
accurate transaction 
reports in respect of 
approximately 18.8 
million transactions, 
representing 80% of its 
reportable transactions 
Unintentional on the lower 
level of hierarchy 
(Sup 17) - Despite an earlier 
acknowledgement within the Firm of 
the need to conduct a review of its 
transaction reporting regime, the 
)LUP¶VLQDFWLRQSUHYHQWHGLWIURP
performing the necessary tests and 
reporting the results to the FSA, 
SocGHQ¶VIDLOXUHVRFFXUUHGGXULQJD
period of heightened awareness 
around transaction reporting issue 
but the senior management failed to 
take any action 
These failings endured 
and their impact on the 
)6$¶VDELOLW\WRGHWHFW
potential market abuse 
and reduce financial 
crime. As the errors 
also create a serious 
risk of hampering other 
FRPSHWHQWDXWKRULWLHV¶
work in maintaining 
market confidence 
Inaccurate 
Reporting, 
Managerial 
Negligence 
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14 Data Security in 
the context of 
outsourcing 
arrangements ( 
between Zurich UK 
and Zurich 
Insurance 
Company South 
Africa Limited 
(ZICSA)) exposing 
customers to the 
risk of financial 
loss, burglary and 
identity theft 
Process Failure: ZISCA 
engaged a subcontractor 
to collect and deliver 
unencrypted data and to 
provide storage facility. 
Then the subcontractor 
itself subcontracted the 
collection and delivery of 
this data to a 3rd party 
contractor (unknown to 
ZICSA and without Zurich 
8.*,¶VFRQVHQW
Failings arisen after a 
data loss incident: 
subcontractors lost an 
unencrypted back-up tape 
during a routine transfer 
to a data storage centre. 
Zurich UK became aware 
of the incident a year later 
as a result of internal 
audit. 
Unintentional: Data loss 
incident was not reported 
until a year later, raised 
further issues within the 
business, ZICSA conducted 
procedures without the 
consent of Zurich UK 
(3, SYSC 3.1.1R, SYSC 3.2.6R) - Lack 
of ongoing risk assessment and 
effective monitoring over outsourcing 
arrangements. Lack of oversight of 
ZICSA may have contributed to data 
loss, inadequate due diligence on the 
data security, insufficient reporting 
and management information flow 
which prevent governance to identify, 
measure, manage and control data 
security and financial crime risks, 
routine monitoring was limited to 
regular service management 
conference calls, various members of 
senior management had responsibility 
for data security issues, but there 
was no single data security manager 
with overall responsibility, the failures 
occurred following a period of 
heightened awareness of financial 
crime issues as a result of 
government initiatives and increasing 
media coverage, unclear 
management responsibilities and 
reporting lines, lack of training and 
awareness regarding the 
understanding of data security 
The cumulative impact 
of the failings 
represented a material 
ULVNWRWKH)6$¶V
objectives of reducing 
financial crime and 
protecting customers. 
Supervision 
15 Risk of Money 
Laundering 
Absent of screening 
procedure related to 
international trade 
transactions, insufficient 
customer  information 
was recorded 
Unintentional due to lack of 
appropriate training and 
management expertise 
relating to UK sanctions 
screening 
(20(1)) - inadequate screening of 
relevant customers and payments 
against the Treasury list,  after 
screening procedure implementation 
failed to ensure its design and review 
and monitor the process, discovery 
and escalation of information issues, 
The involvement of UK 
financial institutions in 
providing funds, 
economic resources or 
financial services to 
designated persons on 
the Treasury list 
undermines the UK 
financial services 
sector integrity. Unless 
they have in place 
robust systems and 
controls, UK financial 
institutions risk being 
used to facilitate 
transactions involving 
sanctions targets, i.e. 
terrorist financing. 
Training 
Lack of 
Expertise 
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16 Inaccurate and 
Incomplete 
transaction 
reporting 
Reporting Transaction 
Process: failed to submit 
accurate transaction 
reports in respect of 
approximately 40 million 
transactions 
Irresponsible behaviour: 
Staff had not submit the 
mandatory static data form 
to the External ARM so it 
had stopped transaction 
reporting on behalf of 
Credit Suisse 
(SUP 17) - Inadequate controls in 
relation to transaction reporting, 
failures occurred during a period of 
heightened awareness around 
transaction reporting issues depicting 
corporate governance inefficiencies, 
Credit Suisse mistakenly assumed 
that 25% of its reportable 
transactions were being reported on 
its behalf by the External ARM but 
failed to develop and implement 
controls to confirm that those reports 
were being submitted, failed to 
impose controls to ensure that 
reporting is implemented according to 
the FSA requirements 
&UHGLW6XLVVH¶VIDLOXUH
to submit accurate 
transaction reports 
could have a serious 
LPSDFWRQWKH)6$¶V
ability to detect and 
investigate suspected 
market abuse and 
consequently could 
LPSDFWWKH)6$¶VDELlity 
to maintain market 
confidence and reduce 
financial crime, its 
failure has impaired 
WKH)6$¶VDELOLW\WR
provide accurate 
transaction reporting 
data to overseas 
regulators;  the errors 
also create a serious 
risk of hampering other 
competent authorities¶
work in maintaining 
market confidence and 
RIGDPDJLQJWKH)6$¶V
credibility within the 
EEA 
Lack of controls 
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17 Unfair Customer 
Treatment 
Failures occurred from 
errors from a 3rd party 
data producer as a result 
consumers being misled 
as to the true nature of 
the investments held by 
the Fund and, as a result, 
being given misleading 
information on the risk of 
capital losses, displaying 
on its website unclear and 
unfair marketing material 
Employees raised concerns 
on the issues but no action 
was taken 
(3, 7) - Inadequate systems or 
controls; to ensure that marketing 
material issued accurately reflected 
the investment strategy for the Fund, 
to investigate concerns regarding 
marketing material, resulting in a 
failure to promptly remedy failings 
after concerns were raised, internal 
reviews were too narrow and failed to 
identify failings properly, inadequate 
controls around the arrangements 
with the data producer, these control 
weaknesses extended beyond the 
Fund and related to all factsheets 
produced by the data producer, lack 
of data quality assurance, issue were 
not escalated to senior management-
data producer continued to issue 
incorrect and misleading factsheets, 
ineffective communication between 
business areas and committees 
resulting in lack of awareness, 
business operated in distinct silos 
without any one having overall 
responsibility for ensuring that the 
marketing material correctly reflected 
the investments held by the Fund 
- Lack of 
Leadership 
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18 Unfair Customer 
Treatment 
Sales Process and 
Complaints Handling 
Process Failure 
Unintentional: Sales agents 
did not have the necessary 
skills and knowledge to 
prove customers with 
suitable advice as a result 
of recruitment, training and 
competency failures, 
commission attached to 
sales volume and not on 
quality of sales 
(lack of understanding) 
(3, 6) - Failed to embed a culture 
focused on the importance of treating 
customers fairly, inadequate internal 
controls and governance 
arrangements to mitigate risks of 
unsuitable customer advise and 
unfair treatment of complaints, 
systemic failings; recruitment, 
training, competency, remuneration 
and reward, ineffective controls to 
manage risk of poor customer 
outcomes, lack of monitoring claims 
handling, incomplete documentation 
resulting to ineffective use of 
management information and root 
cause analysis to improve customer 
outcomes, ineffective governance 
arrangement and controls to identify 
and manage risk on TCF, ineffective 
actions when issues arose, TCF had 
been a priority for FSA since 2004 
and governance failed to focus on this 
issue, the selling of additional policies 
to existing customers was a key 
DVSHFWRI&,&$¶VEXVLQHVVPRGHO
failure to mitigate the risk of 
inappropriate sales and sales 
representative behaviour inconsistent 
to TFC requirement 
Presented a significant 
ULVNWRWKH)6$¶V
objective of securing 
protection for 
consumers 
Training 
Remuneration 
Schemes 
90 
 
19 Unfair Customer 
Treatment 
Sales Process Failure: 
Risk of mis-selling of 
financial products: 2,485 
NHFA customers were 
advised to invest in asset-
backed investment 
products (investment 
bonds) which were used 
to fund long-term care 
costs for elderly 
customers but failed to 
ensure the suitability of 
advice 
Inappropriate- failure to 
assess customer risk profile 
that led to advisers 
recommend investment 
strategies inconsistent with 
their tolerance for risk, 
failure to recommend 
alternative products 
(9) - the standard of supervision by 
the sales managers posed a high risk 
of customer detriment, systemic 
failings and persisted over a long 
period (5 years), inadequate sales 
process and standard of supervision 
and management control, inadequate 
procedures for monitoring the quality 
of sales which meant that the issues 
relating to the suitability of advice 
given to customers were not 
identified 
NHFA was the leading 
supplier in the UK of 
independent financial 
advice on long-term 
care products to help 
pay for care costs, with 
a market share in 
recent years 
approaching 60%; 
HSBC is a major global 
financial services 
provider with a 
prominent position in 
the retail consumer 
market. The failures at 
NHFA highlight the 
need for regulated 
firms to ensure that 
where they acquire 
new businesses they 
implement appropriate 
systems and controls 
to manage and oversee 
their activities 
effectively. This 
includes positioning the 
new business in 
reporting structures 
that allow the wider 
Group to identify 
promptly and monitor 
any risks associated 
with new business. 
Where firms do not do 
this there is a 
significant risk of 
regulatory breaches, 
customer detriment 
and reputational 
damage. 
Monitoring 
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20 Unfair Customer 
Treatment 
Sales Process Failure: 
Failed to ensure that 
customers were suitably 
advised relative to the 
Fund for its customers 
Unintentional: advisers 
were not provided with 
adequate training on the 
Fund and its features and 
risks were not sufficiently 
explained to them. 
(9) - Inadequate training, inaccurate 
documentation of describing the Fund 
and its risks, failed to appropriately 
respond to the changing market 
conditions, ineffective compliance 
review of its sale and the Fund, 
inadequate monitoring, failings in 
relation to diversification, Failure to 
adequately investigate and address 
questions raised about past sales, 
failings existed for more than 4 
years, failed to take appropriate 
action to address questions raised by 
a senior staff member relative to the 
Fund and its sales 
The FSA has taken into 
DFFRXQW&RXWWV¶VL]H
and financial resources. 
Coutts is a major 
private bank in the UK. 
As such, it has a 
leading competitive 
position in the market 
and its practices set an 
example for others in 
the financial services 
industry. 
Training 
21 Unfair Customer 
Treatment 
Sales Process Failure: 
Customers were not 
advised suitably, 
according to their risk 
appetite as a result 
customers were exposed 
to an unacceptable risk of 
being sold a SCARP which 
was unsuitable for them 
Intentional-it was the 
responsibility of the Team 
Leaders and Sector Heads 
to supervise the work of the 
Relationship Managers. 
However, Team Leaders 
also had responsibility for 
advising Customers of their 
own. Team Leaders and 
Sector Heads were 
responsible for overseeing 
all business activity within 
their respective business 
units which restricted their 
ability to oversee the work 
carried out by Relationship 
Managers 
(3) - inadequate systems and 
controls in respect to the 
determination of cXVWRPHUV¶DWWLWXGHV
to risk as a result, there was an 
unacceptable risk that Credit Suisse 
UK may not have accurately 
understood the level of risk that 
customers were willing to accept from 
their investments, inadequate 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure 
that its staff took reasonable care to 
ensure the suitability of their advice 
The FSA considered 
Credit Suisse UK¶V size 
and financial resources. 
It is one of the largest 
private banks in the UK 
with gross income of 
approx. £73 million (31 
March 2011). During 
the Relevant Period, it 
advised on the sale of 
1,701 scarps to 623 
customers. The total 
value of scarps sold by 
Credit Suisse UK during 
this period exceeded 
£1.099 billion. As a 
result of its competitive 
position in the market, 
the firP¶VSUDFWLFHVVHW
an example which is 
seen by other market 
practitioners and 
customers. Thus, it is 
vital that it takes 
reasonable care to 
ensure the suitability of 
customer advice. 
Monitoring 
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22 Risk of Bribery and 
Corruption 
Staff conducted unethical 
activities associated with 
making commission 
payments totalling 
£27million to Overseas 
3rd Parties who helped 
Willis Ltd win and retain 
business from overseas 
clients 
Intentional: Unethical/ 
Irresponsible behaviour: 
staff in a large number of 
cases carried out 
insufficient due diligence 
prior to making payments, 
inadequate reporting by 
staff, lack of training and 
guidance concerning bribery 
and corruption 
(3, SYSC 3.2.6R) - Inadequate 
commercial rationale to support 
payments to Overseas 3rd party, lack 
of formal training and brief 
description of the reasons for 
commission payment, inadequate 
documentation leading to inadequate 
monitoring of the effectiveness of its 
procedures, inadequate due diligence 
to evaluate risks involved 
contributing to a weak control 
environment  giving rise to an 
unacceptable risk that payments 
made by Willis Limited to Overseas 
3rd Parties could be used for corrupt 
purposes, including paying bribes to 
persons connected with the insured, 
the insurer or public officials, new 
anti-bribery and corruption policies 
were developed however, the Board 
did not receive sufficient relevant 
management information regarding 
their performance which would have 
allowed them to assess whether 
bribery and corruption risks were 
being mitigated effectively, relied on 
informal means to assess bribery and 
corruption risks, lack of information 
flow inducing problems to remain 
unrevealed, lack of regular 
monitoring 
The involvement of UK 
financial institutions in 
(potentially) corrupt 
practices overseas 
undermines the UK 
financial services 
sector integrity. Unless 
they have in place 
robust systems and 
controls which govern 
the circumstances in 
which payments may 
be made to 3rd parties 
and then ensure 
those systems and 
controls are followed, 
UK financial services 
firms risk contravening 
UK and/or overseas 
anti-bribery laws. The 
)6$¶VILQDQFLDOFULPH
and market confidence 
statutory objectives are 
both endangered by UK 
ILUPV¶IDLOXUHVLQWKLV
regard. Willis Ltd is one 
of the largest insurance 
and reinsurance 
brokerage and risk 
management firms in 
the UK. As such, it has 
a leading competitive 
position in the market 
DQGWKHILUP¶VSUDFWLFHV
set an example which 
is seen by other 
market practitioners 
and customers. 
Training, 
Monitoring, 
Information 
Flow 
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23 Aggressive Growth 
Strategy with a 
specific focus on 
high-risk, sub-
investment grade 
lending 
Corporate Banking 
Division conducted an 
aggressive growth 
strategy despite known 
weaknesses in the control 
framework which means 
that it failed to provide 
robust oversight and 
challenge to the business 
Unintentional: staff were 
incentivised to focus on 
revenue rather than risk 
which induced greater risk 
taking 
(3) - Aggressive strategy continued 
despite market conditions worsening 
thus governance did not take 
reasonable steps to assess, manage 
or mitigate the risks involved in the 
aggressive growth strategy, failed to 
take reasonable care to ensure that 
Governance adequately and prudently 
managed high valued transactions 
which showed signs of stress, culture 
was focused on revenue rather than 
on risk adjusted returns thus 
incentive mechanisms encouraged 
behaviours such as; increasing risk 
appetite, optimism at the expense of 
prudence, regarding risk 
management as a constraint on the 
business rather than integral activity, 
issues on the quality, reliability, 
utility of available management 
information affecting the 
effectiveness with which the risks of 
the business could be assessed, 
managed and mitigated, inefficient 
oversight, issues with quality and 
scope of assurance work, board 
disregarded warning from divisional 
function and HBO's auditors, high 
degree of reliance on relationship 
managers, subject to management 
supervision and oversight, with 
regard to credit analysis and due 
diligence; relationship managers 
dealing in lower value transactions 
were delegated significant power to 
extend further credit to existing 
customers, subject to management 
supervision and oversight; resistance 
to change impeding any efforts to 
improve control framework and 
prioritise risk management, risk 
appetite was not defined 
These failings had, or 
might reasonably be 
regarded as likely to 
have had, a negative 
effect on confidence in 
the UK financial system 
Incentive 
Schemes 
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24 Unfair Customer 
Treatment: 
unsuitable advice 
provided to the 
customers 
Sales Process Failure, Mis-
selling of products: 
Inadequate information 
was given to customers 
regarding the products by 
staff operating out of 
Barclay's retail branches 
Training material was 
inadequate, failed to make 
staff aware about the 
suitability of the products to 
the customers , sales briefs 
and product updates 
referred only to benefits of 
the product, consideration 
of the risks attached to it 
were not submitted 
(9) - inadequate monitoring of sales 
procedures resulting into a failure to 
promptly identify and investigate 
potentially unsuitable sales, 
compliance monitoring identified 
particular but governance failed to 
take appropriate and timely action to 
address them in its sales process and 
a number of unsuitable sales were 
made, concerns were raised by the 
customers but failed to take any 
action, failure in training of advisers, 
deficient training material and 
inaccurate documentation given to 
the advisers concerning the selling 
products without specifying the type 
of risk profile these product should be 
sold to, thus training advisers were 
giving a misleading impression of the 
risks involved, inadequate sales 
process and procedures supervision, 
absent compliance controls 
- Training 
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25 Unfair Customer 
Treatment 
Complain Handling 
Process Failures: It 
received 1.1million 
complaints in 2009 
Complaint handlers did not 
have the necessary 
competence to manage 
customers' complaints and 
did not always follow the 
prescribed process: 
inadequate guidance and 
training, lack of product 
knowledge, lack of formal 
arrangements for cascading 
decisions meaning that 
information was not 
communicated consistently 
and complaint handlers 
dealing with routine 
complaints at the front line 
were not always aware of 
and did not always take 
account of FOS decisions 
when deciding complaints 
(3, 6) - Monitoring at branch level 
and the resulting management 
information produced was ineffective 
in assessing whether customers were 
being treated fairly, controls focused 
on measuring whether complaint 
handlers dealt with complaints within 
target time frames rather than the 
quality of the process. Inadequate 
investigation with complaint handlers 
failing to obtain all the relevant 
factors when investigating complaint, 
limited training on complaint 
handling, failures existed for 2.5 
years, although governance was 
aware of the failures in the complain 
handling process it failed to 
undertake appropriate actions, 
ineffective monitoring of the quality 
of complaint handling at branch level 
thus poor behaviour was undetected, 
management information provided to 
senior management regularly 
highlighted the ongoing issue of 
complaint handlers failing to attach 
on the complaint handling 
management system the mandatory 
acknowledgment and resolution 
letters 
RBS UK Retail is the 
second largest provider 
of retail banking 
products and services 
in the UK with approx. 
2,200 bank branches 
and 15 million 
customers during the 
Relevant Period. The 
majority of consumers 
make complaints 
through the branch 
network, which, as the 
first point of contact, in 
most cases retained 
responsibility for 
resolving any 
complaint received. 
Therefore, given the 
nature of the failings 
there is an 
unacceptably high risk 
that customers may 
not have been treated 
fairly 
Training 
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26 Misconduct 
relating to the 
calculation of 
LIBOR and 
EURIBOR 
undermining the 
integrity of the 
benchmark 
references 
UBS, acting through 
its managers and 
employees, sought to 
manipulate certain LIBOR 
currencies and EURIBOR 
in connection with the 
submission of rates that 
formed part of the 
calculation of LIBOR and 
EURIBOR to benefit 
trading positions 
Unethical illegal behaviour - 
employees involved in the 
misconduct were recklessly 
and frequently deliberate: 
manipulation of UBS' own 
submission involved (all 
currencies departments 
combined) 47 individuals 
where 17 of them were 
Managers. Trader 
submitters influenced the 
submissions they made to 
suit their own trading 
position. Manipulation in 
collusion with brokers and 
other banks: UBS Trader 
colluded with individuals at 
Panel Banks to make 
submissions that benefited 
UBS' trading positions, 
facilitation trades (wash 
trades) and illicit 
transactions were used to 
incentivise and reward 
counterparts. 
(3, 5) - Numerous UBS managers 
knew about the incident and some 
were actively involved in LIBOR and 
EURIBOR manipulations. In total, 
improper requests directly involved 
approx. 40 individuals at UBS, 11 of 
whom were Managers. At least two 
further Managers and five Senior 
Managers were also aware of the 
practice of the manipulation of 
submissions to benefit trading 
positions. The practice of attempts to 
manipulate LIBOR and EURIBOR 
submissions to benefit trading 
positions was often conducted 
between certain individuals in open 
chat forums and in group emails, 
which included at least a further 70 
individuals at UBS. Absence of 
systems, controls or policies 
governing the procedure for making 
LIBOR EURIBOR submissions, 
inadequate review, the new 
procedures were inadequate in their 
design and further were inadequately 
implemented. Management failed to 
manage the business areas 
appropriately, these failings were not 
detected by Compliance nor Group 
Internal Audit 
8%6¶VEUHDFKHVRI
Principle 5 were 
extremely serious. Its 
misconduct gave rise 
to a risk that the 
published LIBOR and 
EURIBOR rates would 
be manipulated and 
undermined the 
integrity of those rates. 
In addition to its 
routine internal 
manipulation of its own 
LIBOR and EURIBOR 
VXEPLVVLRQV8%6¶V
collusion with Panel 
Banks and Brokers 
significantly increased 
the risk of 
manipulation of the 
published JPY LIBOR 
rates because the 
averaging process 
applied to submissions 
as part of the 
calculation of the 
published rate means 
that the risk of 
manipulation is greater 
if more than one Panel 
%DQN¶VVXEPLVVLRQKDV
been manipulated. 
UBS, and in particular 
its investment bank, is 
one of the biggest, 
most sophisticated and 
well-resourced financial 
services institutions in 
the UK. Serious 
breaches committed by 
a firm such as UBS 
merit the highest 
penalties 
Absence of 
Controls 
Lack of Internal 
Audit 
Inadequate 
systems review 
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27 Rogue Trader Rogue Trading incident: 
Kweku Adoboli on the 
Exchange Traded Funds 
Desk in the GSE trading 
division had amassed 
substantial losses 
amounting to $2.3 billion 
through his trading 
Illegal unethical behaviour: 
fraud of market abuse and 
false accounting 
(3, 2) - Insufficient focus on the key 
risks associated with unauthorised 
trading within the GSE business 
resulting into significant control 
breakdowns allowing concealment to 
remain undetected for a long period, 
failed to adequately supervise the 
GSE business with due skill, care, 
diligence. Inadequate systems and 
controls in place to detect the 
unauthorised trading in a timely 
manner, inadequate focus on risk 
management systems and to 
sufficiently escalate or take sufficient 
action in respect of identified risk 
management issues, failed to: 
provide appropriate level of 
supervision, challenge appropriately 
the employees in question, 
implement effective remedial 
measures in response to several 
warning signs that occurred during 
the course of its business, put in 
place systems and controls to 
adequately mitigate the risk that its 
employees would undertake 
unauthorised trading and where such 
unauthorised trading was carried out, 
to detect the trading in a timely 
manner,  inadequate systems and 
controls for countering the risks 
posed by unauthorised trading 
Market confidence was 
put at risk, given the 
sudden announcement 
to the market size and 
the losses announced. 
Negative 
announcements such 
as this, put a real risk 
the confidence 
investors are prepared 
to have in financial 
markets. 
Supervision 
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28 Unfair Customer 
Treatment: Mis-
selling of products 
for nearly 7 years 
Sales Process promoted 
an excessive focus on 
sales, revenue, and 
commercial objectives at 
the expense of treating 
customers fairly 
Unintentional: Sales 
advisers were 
inappropriately seeking to 
persuade customers to buy 
insurance cover, which they 
did not need, on the basis 
that customers could cancel 
them during the 'cooling-
off' period, while they 
pursued inappropriate 
objection handling 
techniques to discourage 
customers to cancel their 
policies 
(3, 6, 7) - despite being alert by FSA 
CPP continued to pursue this sales 
approach, failed to identify issues in 
the sales control, corporate 
governance provided: lack of 
acceptance in the Compliance report 
2007, conflicting information about 
decision making in the firm as it was 
unclear which body took decision CPP 
or the UK leadership team-the UK 
leadership team was not a formal 
body and the matters discussed and 
decisions taken were not recorded. 
Compliance oversight, firm's practices 
did not match its documentation, the 
board was aware of these failings but 
failed to take sufficient action to deal 
with them 
- Training 
29 Mortgage Systems 
relied upon 
incorrect records 
for 8 years-
customers were 
not receiving 
important 
information, thus 
making 
insufficiently 
informed decisions 
about their 
mortgage accounts 
Errors existed in the 
information held on BOS 
mortgage systems which 
resulted from an 
inadequate systems 
integration and from 
manual processing errors, 
systems were not 
consistently integrated 
and properly synchronised 
generating incorrect 
mortgage offer letters to 
customers 
Manual Error: Staff required 
to manually updating the 
Borrowers System to reflect 
the new Version. However, 
this manual change was not 
always effected and as a 
result approximately 
FXVWRPHUV¶GHWDLOV
were not updated on the 
Borrowers System 
(3) - failed to identify errors that led 
to inaccurate information being held 
on its mortgage systems, errors were 
only identified after customer 
complaints rather than through 
internal systems. Errors occurred 
from inadequate systems integration 
and manual processing errors 
- Lack of Manual 
systems control 
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30 Misconduct 
relating to its 
submission of 
rates which formed 
part of the LIBOR 
EURIBOR setting 
process: Barclays 
inappropriately 
accounted for its 
Derivatives 
Traders position 
when making US 
dollar LIBOR and 
EURIBOR 
submissions for 5 
years 
External Factor: Media 
and negative publicity 
against its low LIBOR 
submission raising 
questions whether its 
submissions indicated 
liquidity problems induced 
senior management to 
give instructions to lower 
senior managers to 
reduce LIBOR submissions 
to avoid negative publicity 
Unethical, Illegal: 
Inappropriate submissions 
requested by derivatives 
traders (including requests 
made from derivatives 
trader at other banks) 
motivated by profit seeking 
to benefit %DUFOD\¶V Trading 
Positions. There were at 
least 14 Derivatives Traders 
including senior Derivatives 
Traders. Trading Desk 
Managers received or 
participated in 
inappropriate 
communications, internal 
traders were completing 
favours of external traders- 
unclear guidelines about 
the importance of the 
integrity of the process, 
lack of training about 
submission process and 
appropriateness of requests 
for favourable submissions 
(2, 3, 5) - Failed to observe proper 
standards of market conduct when 
making US dollar LIBOR and 
EURIBOR submission. Systems and 
control failings: no specific systems 
and controls in place relating to its 
LIBOR and EURIBOR submissions 
processes, compliance failings, and 
LIBOR issues were escalated to 
Barclay's Investment banking 
compliance function where 
compliance failed to asses and 
address the issues effectively, 
compliance failure let to unclear and 
insufficient communication about 
issues to the FSA. Senior managers 
were more concerned over negative 
publicity perception over LIBOR 
submission than efficiency of internal 
controls. System and Control 
Failures: inadequate monitoring of 
the submission process, no spot 
checks on the level of actual 
transactions in the interbank market, 
lack of integrity review, lack of 
understanding the risks of submission 
process, unclear lines of responsibility 
for systems and controls, lack of 
guidance concerning internal or 
external inappropriate 
communications, senior manager 
raised concerns about potential of 
conflict of interest between 
Submitters and derivatives traders  
but compliance took no action, 
compliance failed to report the issues 
at the FCA 
Where Barclays made 
submissions which took 
into account the 
requests of its own 
Derivatives Traders, or 
sought to influence the 
submissions of other 
banks, there was a risk 
that the published 
LIBOR and EURIBOR 
rates would be 
manipulated. Barclays 
could have benefitted 
from this misconduct to 
the detriment of other 
market participants. 
Where Barclays acted 
in concert with other 
banks, the risk of 
manipulation increased 
materially 
Monitoring 
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31 Failures in 
corporate 
governance and 
control 
arrangements 
resulting in poor 
organisation and 
management 
across its business 
as a whole 
following a 
decision to expand 
and diversify into a 
new business area, 
by writing business 
for European 
clients through 
three branches 
across Europe. 
Developing operations 
failures: Decision to 
change business strategy 
Unintentional: Rotational 
staffing strategy (typically 3 
years): personnel with 
limited experience, skills 
and knowledge on the new 
area were placed in senior 
positions, CEO appointed at 
a critical stage-expansion 
strategy with lack of 
experience, personnel was 
unfamiliar with UK 
regulatory environment, 
understaffing, limited 
training on arrival however 
lack of relevant skills and 
experience remained 
(3) - Failed to consider FSA warning 
on the importance of careful and 
focused board oversight which 
requires good systems and controls. 
Corporate governance, Directors and 
senior management failed to take the 
appropriate measures in a timely 
manner, weak board effectiveness, 
lack of corporate behaviour on the 
board, failed to operate at the level 
appropriate for the size and 
complexity of developing operations, 
inadequate oversight and controls 
and insufficient resources, 
governance focused on profitability of 
the new business without taking 
effective actions to ensure that 
governance and system and controls 
complied with UK regulation, 
insufficient capital reserves, 
inappropriate segregation of duties 
and responsibilities especially relating 
to the Three Lines of Defence which 
was compromised, responsibility for 
functions within different Lines of 
Defence was not always allocated to 
different individuals, ineffective IT 
systems implementation resulting 
into inadequate and poor quality of  
management information which made 
it unable to control business written 
in its branches, failings undermined 
senior management's ability to 
monitor and control its branch, lack 
of leadership, failed to ensure that 
duties and responsibilities were 
appropriately divided between senior 
members of staff, and took 
inadequate steps to ensure that 
individuals were not given too wide a 
span of responsibility, senior 
management was aware about 
weaknesses but failed to respond 
effectively and failed to appreciate 
risks associated with their 
actions/non-actions 
- Rotating Staff 
scheme, 
Training, 
Lack of 
Experience and 
Skills 
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32 Money Laundering Insufficient customer 
information about their 
profile and poor 
assessment of customer 
riskiness to reduce the 
risk of the bank being 
used for money 
laundering 
Process Design: Staff were 
incentivised to increase the 
customer base without 
focusing on the customer 
quality, lack of proper 
training affecting the 
gathering of due diligence 
information, lack of 
guidance regarding 
customer information 
gathering and assessing the 
source of customer funds 
(3, SYSC) - Inadequate risk 
assessment of the risk of money 
laundering, failed to gather the 
appropriate level of due diligence 
information about high-risk 
customers, to apply robust controls 
when establishing relationships with 
high-risk customers, inconsistent and 
inappropriate level of monitoring to 
its existing customers to identify, 
assess and manage, their risk profile, 
inadequate reviews of its systems 
and controls, relevant customer 
information was not kept up-to-date, 
failings persisted for 3 years and 
were not identified by the firms, 
failing occurred in a period of 
awareness concerning this issue but 
governance failed to take the 
necessary steps, lack of appropriate 
challenge to the bankers, decision 
made by senior managers were based 
on the limited information and poor 
assessment of the bankers' results, 
lack of senior management oversight 
and transaction monitoring, 
inadequate scrutiny of customer 
transactions, insufficient reviews for 
governance to remedy the 
deficiencies 
The laundering of 
money through UK 
financial institutions 
undermines the UK 
financial services 
sector. It is the 
responsibility of UK 
financial institutions to 
ensure that they are 
not used for criminal 
purposes and, in 
particular, that they do 
not handle the 
proceeds of crime. 
Coutts is a high profile 
bank with a leading 
position in the private 
banking market and is 
a gateway to the UK 
financial system for 
high net worth 
international 
customers. It was 
particularly important, 
therefore, that Coutts 
had robust systems 
and controls to prevent 
and detect money 
laundering. 
Incentive 
Schemes 
33 Risk of Mis-selling 
products 
Sales process Failure: 
Insufficient information 
provided to investors 
about structured products 
that may have caused 
decisions to be made 
without understanding the 
limitations of cover 
offered for those products 
Unintentional: insufficient 
training material relative to 
structured products-did not 
explain circumstances 
where cover would be 
available 
(2, 7, Rule 6.1.16) - Failed to clarify 
properly and conduct full analysis of 
the scope of FSCS coverage despite 
that management was aware that did 
not have full understanding of the 
positions. Inadequate steps to ensure 
its sales advisers were aware of the 
extent of FSCS coverage and properly 
communicated that information to 
investors 
- Training 
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34 Employee submit 
altered 
documentation 
FSA received files which 
have been altered 
improperly-FSA requires 
information it requests 
from firms to be 
submitted in the original 
state and not altered 
Intentional inappropriate 
induced by management 
instructions: staff altered 
staff altered the files that 
had to be submitted to FSA  
in order to avoid 
disciplinary actions 
(2) - Inadequate systems to ensure 
that files requested by FSA were not 
improperly altered as a result of 
failure occurred in the fine review. 
Management failure: Prior to the start 
of the earlier exercise, management 
had told staff during a conference call 
that if they were found not to be 
operating to the required standards, 
they would face internal disciplinary 
investigation. This message to staff 
increased the risk that files would be 
altered improperly. Failed to take 
robust steps to ensure that the FSA 
receives accurate information. 
Submitting altered 
information 
XQGHUPLQHVWKH)6$¶V
ability to supervise 
effectively the financial 
services sector and 
meet its objectives of 
protecting consumers 
and promoting market 
confidence; and the 
Firms are part of RBS 
Insurance which is a 
prominent institution 
with significant 
operations in the UK. 
RBS Insurance is the 
second largest general 
insurance provider and 
the largest personal 
insurer in the UK. The 
size and potential 
consumer impact of 
5%6,QVXUDQFH¶V
operations require a 
significant degree of 
supervision from the 
FSA. The FSA relies on 
the receipt of accurate 
information from RBS 
Insurance in order to 
supervise its operations 
effectively. 
Management 
Failure 
Wrong 
incentives 
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Appendix 4: Reaction to an Incident  
(The shades indicate similarities across the cases) 
Case Incident Reaction at Operational Level Reaction at Managerial Level 
7 Recognised No action Ineffective action by managers 
15 Recognised No action Ineffective action by managers 
28 Recognised by 
FSA 
No action Aware about failures but no action was taken 
29 Recognised only 
after customer 
complaints 
No action No action 
20 Recognised Senior Member raised awareness No action 
23 Recognised by 
auditors 
Divisional levels raised awareness No action 
4 Recognised Slow information flow along the 
hierarchy 
Failed actions 
12 Recognised Action initiated by employee Aware about failures but no action was taken 
17 Recognised Employees raised awareness No effective actions resulting from 
miscommunication and silo operations 
14 Recognised by 
Internal Review 
a year later 
Action initiated by employee Could be avoided if managers took action to 
FSA's warnings 
26 Unrecognised Action initiated by employees Managers were also involved in the illegal actions 
3 Unrecognised No action Could be recognised if management took action 
to FSA's warnings 
5 Unrecognised No action Could be recognised if management took action 
to FSA's warnings 
8 Unrecognised No action Could be recognised if management took action 
to FSA's warnings 
9 Unrecognised No action Could be recognised if management took action 
to FSA's warnings 
13 Unrecognised No action Could be recognised if management took action 
to FSA's warnings 
16 Unrecognised No action Could be avoided if managers took action to 
FSA's warnings 
18 Unrecognised No action Could be avoided if managers implemented 
controls in accordance with FSA's requirements 
31 Unrecognised No action Could be avoided if managers took action to 
FSA's warnings 
32 Unrecognised No action Could be recognised if management took action 
to FSA's warnings 
6 Unrecognised No action due to inexperienced 
staff 
No action 
10 Unrecognised No action No action 
11 Unrecognised No action No action 
1 Unrecognised No action No action 
2 Unrecognised No action No action 
19 Unrecognised No action No action 
21 Unrecognised No action No action 
22 Unrecognised No action No action 
24 Unrecognised No action No action 
25 Unrecognised No action No action 
27 Unrecognised No action No action 
30 Unrecognised No action No action 
33 Unrecognised No action No action 
34 Unrecognised No action No action 
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Appendix 5: Causes of Behaviour and Employee Intentions 
 (The shades indicate similarity across the cases)  
Case Causes of behaviour Intentional or Unintentional 
12 Lack of controls Intentional 
26 Lack of controls Intentional 
2 Incentive Schemes Intentional 
34 Incentive Schemes Intentional 
19 Monitoring Intentional 
30 Monitoring Intentional 
6 Supervision Intentional 
7 Supervision Intentional 
14 Supervision Intentional 
27 Supervision Intentional 
22 Training and Monitoring Intentional 
23 Incentive Schemes Unintentional 
32 Incentive Schemes Unintentional 
17 Lack of leadership Unintentional 
13 Managerial Negligence Unintentional 
1 Training Unintentional 
3 Training Unintentional 
4 Training Unintentional 
7 Training Unintentional 
15 Training Unintentional 
24 Training Unintentional 
25 Training Unintentional 
28 Training Unintentional 
31 Training Unintentional 
33 Training Unintentional 
14 Training Unintentional 
20 Training Unintentional 
6 Training (of the back office) Unintentional 
5 Training and Incentive Schemes Unintentional 
18 Training and Incentive Schemes Unintentional 
8 Training Unintentional but inappropriate 
9 Training Unintentional but inappropriate 
10 Training and Monitoring Unintentional but inappropriate 
11 Training and Monitoring Unintentional but inappropriate 
21 Monitoring Unintentional but irresponsible 
29 Lack of manual system controls Unintentional but irresponsible 
16 Lack of controls Unintentional but irresponsible 
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Appendix 6: Causes of Failure at the Institution Level  
(The shades indicate similarity across the cases) 
Case Cause of Failure 
3 Corporate Governance 
5 Corporate Governance 
6 Corporate Governance 
8 Corporate Governance 
9 Corporate Governance 
12 Corporate Governance 
13 Corporate Governance 
14 Corporate Governance 
15 Corporate Governance 
16 Corporate Governance 
34 Corporate Governance 
25 Corporate Governance 
28 Corporate Governance 
33 Corporate Governance 
4 Organisational Culture 
7 Organisational Culture 
18 Organisational Culture 
19 System and Controls 
1 Systems and Controls 
2 Systems and Controls 
10 Systems and Controls 
11 Systems and Controls 
21 Systems and Controls 
27 Systems and Controls 
29 Systems and Controls 
32 Systems and Controls 
23 Corporate Governance, Organisational Culture 
22 Organisational Culture, Systems and Controls 
17 Systems and Controls, Organisational Culture 
24 Systems and Controls, Corporate Governance 
31 Corporate Governance, Systems and Controls 
30 Systems and Controls, Corporate Governance, Organisational Culture 
26 Systems and Controls, Corporate Governance, Organisational Culture 
20 Corporate Governance, Organisational Culture, Systems and Controls 
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Appendix 7: Impact of People Behaviour in the Industry 
(The shades indicate similarity across the cases) 
Case Impact of People Risk 
18 Customer Protection 
8 Customers Protection 
9 Customers Protection 
16 FSA's ability to maintain Market confidence and reduce financial crime 
26 Direct Impact 
30 Direct Impact 
15 Integrity of FSA 
22 Integrity of FSA 
32 Integrity of FSA 
34 Integrity of FSA 
10 Integrity of FSA, Market Confidence and Financial Crime, Size 
14 Material Risk to the FSA's objectives 
4 Market Confidence 
6 Market Confidence 
13 Market Confidence 
23 Market Confidence 
27 Market Confidence 
2 Size 
12 Size 
20 Size 
21 Size 
25 Size 
19 Size, Stricter Regulation 
3 Stricter Regulation 
1 - 
5 - 
7 - 
11 - 
17 - 
24 - 
28 - 
29 - 
31 - 
33 - 
 
 
